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Who steals my purse steals trash; 'tis something, nothing; 
'Twas mine, 'tis his, and has been slave to thousands; 
But he that filches from me my good name 
Robs me of that which not enriches him, 
And makes me poor indeed.** 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Attribution is foundational to the modern economy.  The reputation we 
develop for the work we do proves to the world the nature of our human 
capital.  Credit is instrumentally beneficial in establishing a reputation, and 
intrinsically valuable simply for the pleasure of being acknowledged.  Indeed, 
credit is itself a form of human capital.  If professional reputation were 
property, it would be the most valuable property that most people own.  In 
Hollywood, screen credit is wonderful on a blockbuster and terrible on a flop. 
In academia, being an author or inventor is often more valuable than owning 
the copyright or patent.  In high velocity labor markets,1 attributions of 
creativity and competence are the core of references or resumes.  Credit 
matters in an information economy because it is difficult to measure worker 
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failed to credit the research assistance of Katherine Scott, Kathrin Weston, Laura 
Durity, Donna Nixon, and Jeff Chemerinsky, as well as the comments of Jamie 
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** William Shakespeare, Othello, act 3, scene 3. 
1 The term “high velocity labor market” is a vivid description of an economic sector 
characterized by an extremely mobile labor force; the term is Alan Hyde’s.  See 
ALAN HYDE, WORKING IN SILICON VALLEY:  AN ECONOMIC AND LEGAL ANALYSIS 
OF A HIGH VELOCITY LABOR MARKET (2003). 
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knowledge directly in the way that the ability of typists and machinists can be 
tested simply by watching them perform a task. 
 
Attribution plays important functions in addition to its role in human 
capital.  First, it is one of the principal psychic and economic rewards of 
innovation.  The twentieth-century corporation transformed the reward 
function of attribution in a manner that law in the twenty-first century 
knowledge economy must address. Corporate intellectual property and 
corporate employment were initially regarded as a threat to innovation and, 
therefore, to entrepreneurship, but firms avoided malaise by devising 
attribution schemes to reward and promote innovation.  Second, attribution 
serves a trademark function: the same novel would sell better with John 
Grisham’s name on the cover rather than mine, and a scientific study produced 
by a respected university scientist is more likely to be considered reliable than 
one conducted by pharmaceutical company employees.  Moreover, attribution 
marks the divide between news and propaganda, as suggested by the furor over 
U.S. efforts to place American government-produced reports on the occupation 
of Iraq in Iraqi and U.S. news media as if they were written by Iraqi or U.S. 
news media employees.2  Attribution even serves a legitimating function: when 
Hollywood studios became concerned about unauthorized duplication of 
DVDs, they created a series of short ads featuring technical workers explaining 
how piracy affects their livelihood by hurting sales of major motion pictures.  
Deploying the emotion of a set builder in a flannel shirt – a guy who in no 
circumstances will ever have a claim to intellectual property rights in a film – 
is a persuasive rhetorical strategy because it links the sanctity of corporate 
copyrights to the paychecks of real people. 
 
Although attribution is ubiquitous and important, it is largely 
unregulated by law.  Intellectual property law does not because corporations 
own IP and there is no American equivalent of the moral right of attribution.3  
Nor has employment law filled the gap.  In the absence of law, economic 
sectors that value attribution have devised non-property regimes founded on 
social norms to acknowledge and reward employee effort and to attribute 
responsibility for the success or failure of products and projects.  Whether it is 
screen credit, scientific authorship, or the employee of the month, norms play 
at least as large a role as legal rules in mediating among different possible 
candidates for praise or blame.  Attribution is one of many areas of the work 
                                                 
2 Jeff Gerth, Military’s Information War is Vast and Often Secretive NY Times, Dec. 
11, 2005 at A1. 
3 A right of attribution in copyrighted works is protected under the moral rights 
doctrine.  See, e.g., David Vaver, Moral Rights Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow, 7 
INTL J.L. & INFO. TECH. 270 (2000).  
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relationship in which norms dwarf the significance of law in the creation and 
enforcement of rights.4  To understand attribution – a topic of central 
importance both to employment law and to intellectual property – we must 
understand the norms governing it. 
 
Attribution has recently gained scholarly attention in law, the sciences, 
and the humanities.  Intellectual property scholars have explored the trademark 
aspects of author designations to advocate trademark or copyright protection.5   
Others examine the complex meanings of scientific authorship attribution 
reform in academic publishing.6  And, of course, literary scholars have long 
contemplated the significance of author attributions.  My purpose is broader.  
Through a conceptual merger of intellectual property and employment law, this 
article studies how credit and blame are allocated in many sectors of society 
that tend to be below the radar of intellectual property law.  Regardless of who 
owns patents, copyrights, trademarks, trade secrets, or other workplace 
knowledge, workplace rules and norms regulate why some contributors are 
credited as creators, some only acknowledged for assistance, and some not 
noted at all.     
 
Working from assessment of how attribution systems operate, I offer a 
theory of how such systems should operate and why greater legal recognition 
of attribution rights is desirable.  The right I propose would be neither a 
property right in the intellectual property sense nor a liability rule in the tort 
sense (unlike, for example, the torts of publicity or defamation), both of which 
give a qualified right to prevent sale or dissemination of a work without proper 
attribution.  Rather, I argue for greater attention to attribution rights within the 
existing legal regime of employment contracts.  The proposal is a specific 
                                                 
4 See, e.g., Cynthia Estlund, Rebuilding the Law of the Workplace in an Era of Self-
Regulation, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 319 (2005); Susan Sturm, Second Generation 
Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 458 
(2001). 
5 Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and 
Trademarks Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263 (2004); Jane C. Ginsburg, Essay – The 
Author’s Name as a Trademark:  A Perverse Perspective on the Moral Right of 
Paternity? Columbia Law School Pub. Law & Leg. Theory Working Paper No. 05-
91, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=724343; Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The 
Attribution Right in the United States:  Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright 
and Section 43(a), 77 WASH. L. REV.  985 (2002); Greg Lastowka, The Trademark 
Function of Authorship, 85 BOSTON U. L. REV. 1171 (2005); Laura A. Heymann, The 
Birth of the Authornym:  Authorship, Pseudonymity, and Trademark Law, 80 NOTRE 
DAME L. REV. 1377 (2005). 
6 See infra at notes 80 - 86. 
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instantiation of the legal theory of reflexive law:  an effort to regulate behavior 
with the goal of protection by the shaping of norms and through self-regulatory 
structures.7  My goal is to make all aspects of attribution more efficient and fair 
without encroaching unduly on the free circulation of ideas or undermining the 
flexibility of existing norms-based approaches to attribution.  Because 
innovation is spurred by information spillovers linked to employee mobility; 
people should have attribution rights to enable that mobility without restricting 
the use of the information that enables innovation.  In short, legal rights to 
knowledge must be bifurcated into exclusivity rights (traditional IP rights to 
control the knowledge) and attribution rights (rights to control reputation).  
 
Part I demonstrates the importance of attribution, with particular 
attention to its historic development.  Part II posits six desirable characteristics 
of any attribution regime, describes the variety of formal and informal 
attribution systems in various industries, and explores how the current mix of 
legal rules and social norms measure up to the six ideal characteristics.  Part III 
explains, based on evidence and economic theory, why extant contract-based 
and norms-based attribution regimes fail optimally to protect attribution 
interests.  Part IV proposes a new approach to employment contracts designed 
to shore up the desirable characteristics of existing norms-based attribution 
systems while allowing legal intervention only in the circumstances of market 
failure.  I propose that a right of attribution, whose existence would be 
determined by workplace or industry norms, be regarded as a legally 
enforceable implied term of every employment contract.  The right to public 
attribution would be waivable upon proof of a procedurally fair negotiation.  
The right to attribution necessary to build human capital, however, would be 
inalienable.   Thus, while The Economist would remain free to insist that its 
writers use no bylines, it would be contractually obligated fairly to attribute 
articles in its own internal employee assessments and in the context of 
recommending writers for jobs at other organizations.  A breach of the implied 
agreement would not, unlike moral rights, entitle the employee to block access 
to the work itself; the only remedy would be for the lost value of human 
capital.  As explained in the conclusion, the variation in attribution norms that 
currently exists among economic sectors and different workplace cultures can 
and should be preserved through the contract approach I suggest.  My proposal 
                                                 
7 The vast literature on reflexive law is summarized and applied to the workplace 
context in Orly Lobel, The Renew Deal: The Fall of Regulation and the Rise of 
Governance in Contemporary Legal Thought, 89 MINN. L. REV. 342 (2004).  See 
also REFLEXIVE LABOUR LAW: STUDIES IN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS AND 
EMPLOYMENT REGULATION (Ralf Rogowski & Ton Wilthagen, eds. 1994); PHILIPPE 
NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD 
RESPONSIVE LAW 64 (1978). 
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also strikes an appropriate balance between expansive and narrow legal 
protections for workplace knowledge and, in that respect, addresses one of the 
most vexing current debates at the intersection of intellectual property and 
employment law. 
 
I. Attribution Matters 
 
The most important but least studied function of attribution is its role 
in creating and signaling human capital.  In an information economy, especially 
one characterized by high degrees of labor turnover, human capital is 
fantastically important to employees and to firms.8  Particularly in the case of 
highly-educated or highly-skilled employees or people who possess a great 
deal of tacit knowledge, assessing the nature and value of human capital is 
difficult.9  The abilities of a software designer or music producer cannot be 
measured the way the speed of a typist or the competence of a machine 
operator can.  When the cost of errors in assessment is great, or when 
assessments about human capital need to be made frequently or rapidly, easily 
interpreted information about human capital is valuable because it reduces 
search costs.  Thus credit becomes a form of human capital itself because it 
translates and signals the existence of a deeper layer of human capital.   
 
Attribution has a commodity value distinct from the value of the 
intellectual property or human capital to which it is attached.  The commodity 
value of credit is entirely informational:  it tells consumers, current and 
                                                 
8 The study of human capital was catalyzed by GARY BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL 
(1964) and by THEODORE W. SCHULTZ, INVESTMENT IN HUMAN CAPITAL (1971).  
See also RICHARD CRAWFORD, IN THE ERA OF HUMAN CAPITAL:  THE EMERGENCE 
OF TALENT, INTELLIGENCE, AND KNOWLEDGE AS THE WORLDWIDE ECONOMIC 
FORCE AND WHAT IT MEANS TO MANAGERS AND INVESTORS (1991) (business 
management advice); JOHANN PETER MURMANN, KNOWLEDGE AND COMPETITIVE 
ADVANTAGE:  THE COEVOLUTION OF FIRMS, TECHNOLOGY, AND NATIONAL 
INSTITUTIONS (2003) (economic history).  
9 Tacit knowledge is knowledge that cannot readily be reduced to writing and tends 
to be acquired by doing, rather than by the usual method of teaching a body of 
information.  See, e.g., ARTHUR S. REBER, IMPLICIT LEARNING AND TACIT 
KNOWLEDGE: AN ESSAY ON THE COGNITIVE UNCONSCIOUS (1993); Mark Lehrer & 
Kazuhiro Asakawa, Managing Intersecting R&D Social Communities: A 
Comparative Study of European 'Knowledge Incubators' in Japanese and American 
Firms, 24 ORG. STUD. 771 (2003); Roy Lubit, Tacit Knowledge and Knowledge 
Management: The Keys to Sustainable Competitive Advantage, 29 ORGANIZATIONAL 
DYNAMICS 164 (2001); Frederick A. Starke et al., Coping with the Sudden Loss of an 
Indispensable Employee: An Exploratory Case Study, 39 J. APPLIED BEHAV. SCI. 208 
(2003). 
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prospective employers, creators, and the world at large about products and their 
creators.  The commodity value of credit is dissipated if the right to it is 
transferred because the information is lost.  Attribution is a form of signal and 
it operates in labor and other markets plagued by information asymmetries in 
which reliable signals are important. 
 
For nearly a century, American intellectual property law tended to 
assume that intellectual property and attribution rights did and should 
substantially overlap.  Intellectual property rights – patents, copyrights, and, to 
some extent, trademarks -- were thought to be a principal method by which law 
acknowledged creativity.  Of course, since intellectual property rights have 
long been assignable and there is nothing new in the recognition that major 
contributors to projects are not always joint authors or joint inventors, there 
was never a complete equivalence between IP ownership and attribution.  
Nevertheless, today more than ever, intellectual property is divorced from 
creators. To most employees most of the time, what matters is not that you own 
your patent or copyright, but that you can truthfully claim to be the inventor or 
author of it.   
 
The divorce of intellectual property from credit was slow in coming, 
precisely because the credit function of authorship and invention was so firmly 
entrenched in thinking about the purposes of intellectual property.  Even as 
nineteenth-century American courts were digesting the idea that invention and 
authorship were rarely the solitary activity of single individuals, but were likely 
to occur in workplaces and to be funded by firms, judges still insisted upon 
employee ownership of intellectual property rights because of the power of the 
moral claims to credit for creativity.  Meanwhile, Germany and France reacted 
to the rise of corporate creation by developing moral rights explicitly to protect 
both a right of attribution and a right of integrity.10  By the early twentieth 
century, American courts accepted the corporate control of intellectual property 
and abandoned the view that intellectual property rights had to be tied to actual 
inventor and authors.  
 
Yet it remains important to attribute authorship of ideas, texts, and 
technologies, to actual persons, even if the attribution does not affect 
intellectual property rights.  Not surprisingly, almost every group that creates 
                                                 
10 On the evolution of judicial attitudes toward employee ownership of the fruits of 
workplace creativity, see Catherine L. Fisk, Removing the Fuel of Interest from the 
Fire of Genius: Law and the Employee Inventor, 1830-1930, 65 U. CHI. L. REV.  
(1998); Catherine L. Fisk, Authors at Work:  The Origins of the Work for Hire 
Doctrine, 15 YALE J. LAW & HUMS. (2003). The nineteenth century origins of moral 
rights in the late nineteenth century are discussed in the sources cited infra note 47.   
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anything adopts a process for attributing responsibility.  Paradoxically, in the 
modern information economy where we have moved away from personal 
rights to intellectual property in favor of corporate rights, we increasingly value 
attribution because labor mobility and the decline of personal relationships 
have limited access to other sources of information about employees. 
 
As explained below, attribution serves four principal functions.  
Attribution is, first, is a reward and an incentive for future creativity.  Second, it 
is a form of discipline that punishes unacceptable work.  Third, attribution 
enables consumers to assess quality and sellers to create a brand.  Finally, 
attribution serves a humanizing function, linking the products of work to the 
reality of human endeavor.  Each of these functions requires that the right to 
attribution be inalienable, at least in some contexts, so that the people who are 
credited or blamed for a work are in fact the ones behind it.  Attribution matters 
differently in different contexts, however. The functions of attribution can still 
be served in some contexts when it is alienable vis a vis the public, but it can 
never be alienable as a measure of human capital.11 Within every organization 
attributions are made for purposes of pay, promotion, or blame, for those 
purposes attribution must be inalienable. 
 
 A. The Reward Function 
 
People throughout recorded history have valued the reputations they 
gain by associating their names with their work.  Even when the author, 
inventor, discoverer, or artisan made little or no money from the work itself, it 
has long been an honor to be credited with good work.  Great artists of all 
kinds have destroyed work that they thought did not measure up to their 
standards, even when they might have profited more (at least in the short term) 
from selling their lesser works rather than destroying them.  American 
intellectual property law – which, as is well known, was intended to be an 
instrument to “promote the progress of science and the useful arts” by 
according copyrights and patents to authors and inventors – was premised on 
the idea that people will have a greater incentive to create if creators enjoy not 
merely the income stream from sales of the intellectual property itself but also 
the economic and psychic benefits of the reputation gained by being the 
creator.12   
 
                                                 
11  See, e.g., Heymann, The Birth of the Authornym, supra note 5 at 1422-1433; 
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (right to speak 
anonymously is protected by the First Amendment). 
12 U.S. CONST. Art. I, sec. 8. 
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Nineteenth-century courts believed that actual attributions of 
authorship were an important reward above and beyond the economic value of 
the intellectual property rights themselves.  Courts did not conclude that 
employers were the owners of patented inventions or copyrighted works of 
authorship until the turn of the twentieth century.13  Nineteenth-century courts 
were aware that equating IP ownership with attribution had both intrinsic and 
instrumental motivations: intrinsically it acknowledged the moral value of 
creativity, and instrumentally it encouraged creativity by linking the honors of 
creativity to the actual inventor rather than to the firm.  Thus, for example, 
American patent law has always required the true and original inventor to be 
identified in the patent application,14 even though patents are routinely issued 
to entities other than the inventor based on a pre-invention assignment 
agreement.  Patent law confers an inalienable right to attribution because 
Congress and courts believed that attribution was a valuable reward for 
inventors even when the patent itself was assigned.  Whose work is sufficient 
to “count” him or her as an inventor for purposes of the legally-mandated 
attribution is governed by a complex web of social norms regarding invention 
and the purposes of patenting.15  In time past, social norms suggested that 
patents could not or should not be sought by artisans as opposed to scientists 
because they were not deemed worthy of the honor, as has been shown by 
work on early nineteenth century German optics.16 Who can and should be 
credited with invention is thus culturally specific and wrapped up as much in 
norms about honor and credit as in the supposedly simple fact of who 
conceived a new idea. 
 
                                                 
13 Fisk, Removing the Fuel of Interest, supra note 10; Fisk, Authors at Work, supra 
note 10. 
14 35 U.S.C. § 101 (patents are available to “[w]hoever invents or discovers any new 
or useful process, machine,” etc.); 35 U.S.C. § 115 (patent applicant “shall make oath 
that he believes himself to be the original and first inventor of the process, machine 
[etc.] for which he solicits a patent”).  A patent application must be rejected if the 
true inventor is not the applicant, 35 U.S.C. § 102(f), and a patent issued to anyone 
other than the true inventor is invalid.  Agawam Woolen Co. v. Jordan, 37 U.S. 583, 
602 (1868); Banks v. Unisys Corp., 228 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Solomon 
v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2000); Pannu v. Iolab 
Corp., 155 F.3d 1344, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 1998). 
15 Fisk, Removing the Fuel of Interest, supra note 10; B. ZORINA KHAN, THE 
DEMOCRATIZATION OF INVENTION:  PATENTS AND COPYRIGHTS IN AMERICAN 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, 1790-1920 (2005). 
16 Myles W. Jackson, Can Artisans Be Scientific Authors?  The Unique Case of 
Fraunhofer’s Artisanal Optics and the German Republic of Letters in SCIENTIFIC 
AUTHORSHIP:  CREDIT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN SCIENCE (Mario Biagioli & 
Peter Galison, eds., 2003). 
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Scholars and judges of the early twentieth century feared that 
corporate intellectual property would undermine the reward function of 
attribution.  The fear was part of a more general concern that large firms 
threatened entrepreneurship because creative and potentially entrepreneurial 
people might believe that their own work and risk-taking would not be noticed 
or rewarded.  For example, Joseph Schumpeter hypothesized in his 1911 book, 
The Theory of Economic Development, that economic development is driven, 
in part, by innovation and entrepreneurship, and the entrepreneur is in turn 
driven by “the joy of creating” and “the will to conquer.”17  Schumpeter 
believed that “[i]n the modern corporation, entrepreneurial gains are as a rule 
merged with many other elements into the profit item, and the individuals who 
fill the entrepreneurial function are separated from them – accepting the 
salaries and other prerequisites of executives in lieu of them.”18  Schumpeter 
worried that bureaucratization and automation of the entrepreneurial process 
would undermine the “will to conquer” and lead to a decline in 
entrepreneurship.19  The twentieth century challenge, as Schumpeter correctly 
diagnosed, was to preserve the entrepreneurial spirit within the harness of 
bureaucratic work.  Attribution was crucial in that endeavor.  At the same time, 
the rise of bureaucratic human resources management in the twentieth century 
placed a premium on attributing good and poor work for purposes of 
promotion on the hierarchical job ladders that characterized the large mid-
twentieth century corporation.20 The creation of meaningful attribution systems 
thus became the strategy by which bureaucratic firms attempted to avoid the 
destruction of entrepreneurial capitalism that Schumpeter predicted when he 
suggested that capitalism would be undermined by its own success in building 
large bureaucratic corporations.21   
 
Twentieth century firms developed attribution systems by creating 
internal reward programs for encouraging employees to develop ideas.  
Inventions were typically rewarded both with some monetary bonus and with 
                                                 
17 JOSEPH A. SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (1911); See 
also Richard Swedberg, Introduction in RICHARD SWEDBERG, ED., JOSEPH A. 
SCHUMPETER:  THE ECONOMICS AND SOCIOLOGY OF CAPITALISM 40 (1991). 
18 Joseph A. Schumpeter, Comments on a Plan for the Study of Entrepreneurship in 
SWEDBERG, id. at 417. 
19 Id. 
20 SANFORD JACOBY, EMPLOYING BUREAUCRACY; DANIEL NELSON, MANAGERS AND 
WORKERS:  ORIGINS OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY FACTORY SYSTEM IN THE UNITED 
STATES 1880-1920 (2d ed. 1995). 
21 JOSEPH A. SHUMPETER, CAPITALISM, SOCIALISM AND DEMOCRACY 131-143 (1942, 
repr. ed. 1976); SCHUMPETER, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT supra  
note 17. 
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the implicit promise to recognize the idea as the employee’s and to celebrate 
the individual’s creative achievement within the firm.  An early example of 
such a system was the one developed at Kodak.  Kodak was a firm whose 
business model was built on rapid innovation and the aggressive use of patents 
and trade secrets.22  In addition, Kodak early recognized the importance of 
trademarks and marketing and thus knew the benefits of associating a name 
with an idea.  A company acutely aware of the value of intellectual property 
and that aggressively asserted its claims to intellectual property vis a vis its 
employees had to come up with a system for motivating workers who could 
not claim intellectual property rights.  Starting in 1913 and continuing through 
much of the twentieth century, the company paid its front-line employees for 
useful suggestions in the areas of “Cost Reduction, Accident Prevention, 
Improvement of Product, and General Maintenance.”23  It published lists of 
such suggestions and the dollar amounts awarded, which were sometimes 
nominal but sometimes significant.24  Kodak publications for employees 
pushed the suggestion system, urging employees not to be shy about 
submitting their ideas.25  Articles in those publications featured employees who 
had received unusually large awards for their suggestions.26 
 
Kodak’s was typical of the attribution systems at many large 
twentieth-century technology companies.  Du Pont, like Kodak, aggressively 
                                                 
22 See REESE V. JENKINS, IMAGES AND ENTERPRISE:  TECHNOLOGY AND THE 
AMERICAN PHOTOGRAPHIC INDUSTRY 1839-1925 (1975).  The Kodak R & D story, 
as told by the head of Kodak R & D, is found in C.E. KENNETH MEES, FROM DRY 
PLATES TO EKTACHROME FILM:  A STORY OF PHOTOGRAPHIC RESEARCH (New York:  
Ziff-Davis Pub. Co. 1961). 
23 CAMERA WORKS BULLETIN, Nov. 25, 1913.  The system’s rewards (both monetary 
and honorific) were not available to “supervisory and technical employees whose 
duties involve the submission of new ideas.” EMPLOYEES’ GUIDEBOOK, 1947 ed., at 
48-49. 
24 See e.g. CAMERA WORKS BULLETIN, Nov. 25, 1913; CAMERA WORKS BULLETIN, 
June 1916; CAMERA WORKS BULLETIN, July 1917; KODAK PARK BULLETIN, May 
1917; KODAK PARK BULLETIN, July 1919; KODAK PARK BULLETIN, Mar.-Apr. 1920; 
Suggestion Awards, KODAK MAG., March 1929, at 19. 
25 See e.g. Clayton Benson, No Practical Value!, KODAK MAG., Feb. 1930, at 16. The 
Kodak employee manual advised employees that “[s]ubstantial amounts have been 
paid to employees for suggestions resulting in reduction of costs, improvement of the 
quality of products, and improved safety and fire-prevention methods and appliances,” 
and exhorted employees to “[l]ook upon any new idea as being of possible value to the 
Company and submit it for consideration through the suggestion system on the blanks 
provided in all departments.”  EMPLOYEES’ GUIDEBOOK, 1947 ed., at 48-49. 
26 See e.g. Printing Department Employees Win Suggestion Awards, KODAK MAG., 
June 1927, at 27; A $382.00 Award, KODAK MAG., Feb. 1930, at 23. 
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claimed intellectual property rights to all employee innovations.  Like 
Kodak, it had an elaborate research and development program and developed 
a bonus program to motivate salaried employees to invent without the 
prospect of financial gain from the intellectual property they might develop. 
At Du Pont as elsewhere, employees were critical of the reward system; it was 
too easy and too common, a Du Pont employee complained, for superiors in 
the lab to take credit for the work done by subordinates.  While some 
complained about the modest dollar value of the bonuses, others seemed more 
concerned about the vagaries in who was credited.  Reputation loomed as large 
as money, and the lost opportunity to be entrepreneurial about one’s reputation 
loomed as large as any.27 
 
As these examples suggest, when corporations secured control of 
employees and their intellectual property, managers devised alternatives to 
intellectual property ownership to provide financial and psychic rewards 
deemed necessary to encourage innovation.  Notwithstanding the widespread 
recognition of the importance of such processes, they operated (and continue to 
operate) almost entirely outside the scope of legal regulation.  Firms even 
resisted characterizing the bonus programs as contracts for fear of losing 
discretionary control over credit determinations, although they encouraged 
employees to believe that the systems were fair and consistent.  Inasmuch as 
mid-twentieth century employment law generally gave firms substantial 
leeway to revise employment terms at will, the informality of attribution 
systems was not out of the mainstream of employment practices. 
 
Even today, it is widely recognized that the reward function of 
attribution underpins the system of corporate ownership of workplace 
knowledge.  The economic critique of employee ownership of workplace 
intellectual property rests on the contention that individuals do not need the 
incentive of intellectual property ownership because lucrative employment 
provide sufficient incentive.28  Thus, the argument goes, the reward function of 
intellectual property ownership is most efficiently allocated to the firm.  The 
analysis rests on the assumption that the inventive employee will at least be 
credited with the invention so that his employment will be lucrative in 
proportion to his creativity and, thus, the incentive to invent will remain. 
 
                                                 
27 Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge:  Trade Secrets, Restrictive Covenants in 
Employment, and the Rise of Corporate Intellectual Property, 1800-1920, 52 
HASTINGS L.J. 441 (2001). 
28 Robert Merges, The Law and Economics of Employee Inventions, 13 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 1 (1999); Edmund W. Kitch, The Law and Economics of Rights in Valuable 
Information, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 683 (1980). 
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B. The Discipline Function 
 
Author attribution as a form of discipline is a concept that is quite 
familiar to literary scholars, though perhaps less so to legal scholars.  
Copyright prior to the first English Copyright Act, the 1710 Statute of Anne, 
was almost entirely about disciplining rather than rewarding authors; copyright 
was a system of printing privileges that enabled censorship.  Early copyright 
regulation named the author so that appropriate authorities could institute 
prosecutions for heresy, sedition, or libel.29  Attribution mattered because 
religious authorities were not satisfied to punish only the publisher of heresy 
and to spare the heretic himself. Once copyright became property, the 
disciplinary function of authorship also encompassed defining and policing 
plagiarism, libel, and copyright infringement.30  
 
The disciplinary function of associating a person with an idea exists 
outside the realm of copyright and literary works too.  Historically, scientific 
claims were linked to authors to police heresy; today they are linked to authors 
to police fraud.31  Attributing information is considered an important deterrent 
to gossip and rumor mongering.  Of course, attribution is not always a servant 
of truth:  protecting the anonymity of sources, and especially of leaks, is often 
thought to be the best guarantor of truth.  The recent efforts of the government 
to identify who leaked the information about the covert program of government 
surveillance of U.S. citizens, one might  argue, is designed as much to deter the 
revelation of truthful information as to prevent the spread of false 
information.32  All, of course, are forms of discipline. 
 
 There is a long tradition, extending back to craft guilds of the pre-
modern period, of craftsmen placing their seal on work as an assurance of 
quality.33  Such a system has obviously positive and negative reputational 
effects, depending on the quality of the product.  Today, of course, many 
professional licensing regimes (including in law, medicine, and engineering) 
                                                 
29 See, e.g., MARK ROSE, AUTHORS AND OWNERS:  THE INVENTION OF COPYRIGHT 
(1993). 
30 PAUL K. SAINT AMOUR, THE COPYWRIGHTS:  INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE 
LITERARY IMAGINATION (2003). 
31 Mario Biagioli, Documents of Documents:  Scientists’ Names and Scientific 
Claims, 27 PoLAR 1 (2004); Mario Biagioli, The Instability of Authorship:  Credit 
and Responsibility in Contemporary Biomedicine, 12 LIFE SCIENCES FORUM/THE 
FASEB JOURNAL3 (1998). 
32 Josh Meyer & Daryl Strickland, Justice Department to Probe Leak of NSA’s 
Domestic Surveillance Program, LOS ANGELES TIMES, Dec. 30, 2005. 
33 See Heymann, supra note 5 at 1413 (collecting sources). 
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require that the professional certify the quality of work, and discipline is 
imposed on the person who certifies that the work is satisfactory if the work 
either falls below some standard or if the seal is placed wrongfully.34  In 
academia, credit and responsibility remain clearly tied to the name of the 
scholar, not the copyright owner, and responsibility for the truth of claims falls 
on the natural person whose name is listed as author because the name is the 
link between the person and the claim.35  And in the world of print journalism, 
which tries to walk the fine and shifting line between corporate promotion of 
information products and the objective and reliable reporting of truth, the 
identification of by-lines and contributing reporters is a deliberate effort to 
deter fraud and to focus blame when problems happen anyway.  In this 
perspective, the name recognition of Judith Miller or Jayson Blair saves the 
brand of The New York Times; the fault for journalistic scandals can be 
attributed to individuals rather than to the paper as a whole.36 
 
C. The Branding Function 
 
   Within legal scholarship recently, and within literary scholarship for 
generations, many have explored the significance of attribution in shaping 
perceptions of copyrighted works.37  The phenomenon of how attribution of 
creation creates a sort of brand or a trademark that attaches both to the object 
and to the putative creator is less thoroughly studied when the works in 
question are other than literary texts, but it is as old if not older than the 
phenomenon of literary authorship.38 
 
For as long as creator attributions have been made the question has 
arisen whether the attributions must be accurate, in the sense of referring to a 
particular person by a name that was traceable to that person.  To some extent, 
it was accepted that the right of attribution had to be inalienable in order for the 
branding function to retain its value.  Consumers of both scientific information 
and novels would be justifiably disappointed if the name of the putative author 
was no longer a reliable indication of veracity or quality.  Of course there may 
be circumstances in which attribution to a fictive person is a mark of the 
                                                 
34 Attribution within the context of professional certification is discussed infra at 
II.C.5. 
35 Mario Biagioli, Documents of Documents, supra note 31 at 14. 
36 Attribution issues in print journalism, particularly with respect to scandals such as 
that involving Jayson Blair, are discussed infra at II.C.3. 
37 See, e.g., Heymann, supra note 5. 
38 The original “trade mark,” the mark that an artisan was required by the guild to 
attach to any product made, dates in Europe to a pre-Renaissance period well before the 
phenomenon of literary authorship.  See id at 1413. 
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quality; readers of Nancy Drew novels expect them to be authored by “Carolyn 
Keene” even though she does not exist and the books were written by a number 
of different people according to specifications established by the publisher. 
 
Whereas the credibility of scientific fact was in part tied to the author’s 
name, the author needed in some contexts to avoid being too overtly pushy in 
publishing his work, lest his work lose credibility that way.  Steven Shapin 
remarked that “a disengaged and nonproprietary presentation of authorial self,” 
enhanced credibility by removing the possibility that the scientist had a 
mercenary interest in publishing his work.  As Roger Chartier also observed, 
“The trope of reluctant authorship and resistance to printed publication was 
very common in early modern culture, but it acquired particular meaning with 
scientific texts: it assured their credibility since it proved that there was no 
economic interest attached to the published knowledge claims.” 39 
 
As modern marketing developed, the use of author attributions to 
vouch for the quality of a product became standard.  Rand-McNally, which was 
quite aggressive in claiming all patents and copyrights to all of its maps and 
globes, nevertheless used the names and photographs of its leading 
cartographers in its advertising to convince the public of the quality of its 
products.  The J. Paul Goode atlas and globe, and even the particular methods 
he used for portraying the round earth on a flat map with minimal distortion, 
were attributed to him and his academic credentials (he was a professor at the 
University of Chicago), were featured prominently in their brochures.40  
Whereas centuries before, the name of Gerhardus Mercator was linked to his 
projection in the way that Euclid’s theorem or Copernicus’ theory or Galileo’s 
was, by the early twentieth century the name of the geographer became an 
advertising device more than a celebration of the contributions of the creator.41  
The use of a personal name as a trademark presents ambiguities when the 
                                                 
39 STEVEN SHAPIN, A SOCIAL HISTORY OF TRUTH:  CIVILITY AND SCIENCE IN 
SEVENTEENTH CENTURY ENGLAND (1994); Roger Chartier, Foucault’s Chiasmus:  
Authorship Between Science and Literature in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth 
Centuries, in SCIENTIFIC AUTHORSHIP supra note 16. 
40 The Rand McNally company records are in the Newberry Library in Chicago as 
part of the John M. Wing Foundation on the History of Printing.  The Goode 
documents are in Rand McNally Series 3, Box 7, Folders 69 and 75. I discuss Rand 
McNally’s approach to attribution and employee intellectual property in detail in 
Catherine L. Fisk, Working Knowledge:  Employee Innovation and the Rise of 
Corporate Intellectual Property (2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the 
author). 
41  MARK MONMONIER, RHUMB LINES AND MAP WARS:  A SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE 
MERCATOR PROJECTION (2004). 
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person and the company that bears her name have a parting of the ways, as 
happened recently to the English fashion designer Elizabeth Emanuel, who 
originally made her reputation designing Princess Diana’s wedding dress.  
Should the business to whom the name was assigned as a trademark own the 
right to use of the name, forcing the person to do business under some name 
other than her own, and perhaps prompting customer confusion as to whether 
the person remains involved with the company?  Or is the departure of the 
person from the firm grounds to revoke the assignment because it is misleading 
to suggest the continuing involvement of person with the firm via the name?42 
 
The branding aspects of attribution raise other ambiguities about how 
to allocate responsibility for work.  When some executives of Coca Cola 
attempted, beginning with enormous fanfare and ending in spectacular failure, 
to change the flavor of the signature cola drink about twenty years ago, most of 
the flak fell on the company, not on the chemists who developed the new flavor 
or the executives or marketing people who thought it was a good idea.  And 
when the innovation fell flat, the Coca Cola brand had to be resuscitated as 
well as -- or even more than -- the reputations of the responsible employees.  
One hundred years ago, a spectacular failure of technological innovation would 
have harmed the reputation of the inventor as much or more than the company 
that bore his name. Disaggregating corporate and individual attribution is 
difficult.   
 
Attribution enables the economy of authority and influence to operate, 
as Andy Warhol’s famous quip (“In the future everybody will be world famous 
for fifteen minutes”) suggests.43  Attribution is thus akin to celebrity.  
Intellectuals are not immune to this:  universities seem unable to resist the 
temptation to count citations as a measure of academic accomplishment, even 
as they decry the practice because citation counts reward a controversial 
position on a salient or trendy topic more than a thoughtful analysis of an 
important but unstudied one.  The work a renowned scholar is appealing to 
journals that want to enhance their own reputation by publishing important 
work.  It is a positive feedback loop:  the journal’s reputation is enhanced by 
                                                 
42 Elizabeth Florence Emanuel v. Continental Shelf 128 Ltd., Opinion of Advocate 
General, Case C-259/04, a preliminary ruling for the High Court of Justice of 
England and Wales, by the person appointed by the Lord Chancellor under section 7b 
of the Trade Marks Act of 1984, available at http://curia.edu.int/jurisp (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2006) (departure of Emanuel from the firm that bears her name is not 
grounds for revocation of the assignment of the trademark). 
43 OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 803 (Elizabeth Knowles, ed., 5th ed.) 
(attributes quote to a volume released to mark Warhol’s exhibition in Stockholm, 
February – March, 1968).   
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publishing the work of a renowned scholar, and the scholar’s reputation grows 
by publishing in a preeminent journal. 
 
D. The Humanizing Function 
 
The late twentieth-century erasure of the name of natural person from 
the responsibility for the innovation has dehumanized intellectual property and 
the ideas and work embodied or reflected in it.  The severing of the link 
between people and ideas does not always serve the interests of the 
corporations that own the intellectual property.  Today’s huge anti-piracy 
campaign illustrates the risks.  People on peer-to-peer file-sharing networks 
feel less guilt about unauthorized copying of copyrighted music or DVDs than 
they might feel about shoplifting.  The dire “FBI Warnings” that precede every 
DVD or videocassette you’ve ever watched are just so much noise.  To crack 
down on unauthorized duplication, the copyright owners had to marshal actual 
(and preferably not too wealthy) musicians and performers to make the case 
that copyright infringement is stealing.  In a world of corporate production, and 
in particular skepticism about corporate production, author attributions serve a 
humanizing function.  Dave the set painter who inveighs against piracy by 
lamenting its impact on working class Hollywood does just that.44   
 
Attribution humanizes bureaucratic work processes and legitimates 
business by humanizing it in the eyes of the public.  It translates employee 
effort for public view both for the benefit of employees and for the benefit of 
the firm.  The ubiquitous posters in service workplaces that honor the 
“employee of the month” reward and motivate employees by holding them up 
for compliments as they simultaneously humanize the firm to customers by 
suggesting it’s the kind of place that honors its employees.  Executives 
everywhere from Wal-Mart to Paramount Pictures are aware that they have to 
humanize their work processes in order to shore up the legitimacy of their 
property rights.   
 
Yet there are times in which the actual creator must remain anonymous 
in order to portray the humanity of someone else. The tradition of keeping 
speechwriters well in the background is necessary to preserve the cult of the 
personality in contemporary American politics.  We participate in a willing 
suspension of disbelief when we attribute speeches to the candidate or 
politician, and treat the speeches as a window into the heart and mind of the 
speaker.  At some level we know, or at least we suspect, that some of what he 
                                                 
44 David the set-painter was a real person.  See Patrick Goldstein, The Big Picture: 
Hollywood Deals With Piracy, A Wary Eye on CDs, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 9, 2003, at E1. 
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says is not what he really thinks, or that the turns of phrase may not reflect his 
own personality, but we treat him as if he is speaking his own heart and mind 
and projecting his own personality, not giving voice to the carefully considered 
position of a committee of advisors and speechwriters. Moreover, there is a 
long history to treating pseudonymous writing as suggesting that the author is 
especially “authentic.”45 Perhaps in today’s world skepticism about authenticity 
is even greater.  The desire to link the word to the person – both moving 
backward to the “actual” author and forward through the actor to the character 
played by the actor -- is especially acute in a world in which the glut of 
television, Internet, and digital media blur the boundary between our sense of 
reality and the words and images that constantly surround us.   
 
In sum, contemporary attribution is valuable to creators, to their 
employers, to consumers of information and of products, and to manufacturers 
and sellers of anything.  As will be seen, its importance is reflected in the 
ubiquity of attribution norms in every imaginable occupation.  Its diverse 
functions are reflected in the variety of such norms.   
 
 
II. The Operation of Contemporary Attribution Processes 
 
 Like any landscape painting, the following effort to portray the entire 
field of legal and norms-based rights of attribution cannot cover everything or 
even do justice to most.  I begin with a survey of legal regulation.  I then 
describe six criteria we should use to evaluate how well any law- or norms-
based attribution regime serves the values of attribution that have been 
identified so far.  Finally, I provide a sample of the array of non-legal 
attribution systems that exist.  My goal is to identify the major landmarks of 
law, normative evaluation, and norms.  Of necessity, I can paint only some in 
detail, while evoking a sense of the smaller features and omitting others 
entirely.     
 
A. Legal Rights to Attribution 
 
International law articulates a general right to recognition for the fruits 
of one’s creativity.  Although the right probably emanates from the droit moral, 
which in European countries gives authors a right to attribution for their 
copyrighted works regardless of copyright ownership, the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights recognize the right of 
                                                 
45 Heymann, supra note 5; JENNIE ERDAL, GHOSTING:  A DOUBLE LIFE (2004) (a 
memoir of years spent working as a ghost writer). 
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attribution in general terms, not limited to works that would be eligible for 
copyright.46  French and German laws accord moral rights of attribution and 
integrity to the author.  The moral right of integrity empowers authors to 
prevent certain changes to the work, even if the author is not the copyright 
owner.  The moral right of attribution (sometimes called the right of paternity) 
entitles the author to credit. The Berne Convention, to which the United States 
is a signatory, also recognizes a right of attribution.  Indeed, the right of 
attribution is one of the strongest of the Berne rights.47  In the United States, 
there may be a widespread agreement on a norm of recognition for creativity, 
absent an agreement to waive the recognition, but there is no general legal right 
to be credited for one’s work.   
 
The right of attribution protected by trademark law focuses mainly on 
the linking of words, designs, numbers, or sounds to goods and services, and 
the businesses that sell them.  The purpose of a trademark is to identify and 
distinguish goods or services as coming from a single source.48  Thus, it 
                                                 
46 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 15(1), 
G.A. Res. 2200A, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(1966) (entered into force Jan. 3, 1976).  The ICESCR recognizes the right to 
“benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any 
scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.” 
47  Article 6bis, Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, 
Paris Act of July 24, 1971, as amended on Sept. 28, 1979, 25 U.S.T. 1341, 828 
U.N.T.S. 221, available at http://www.wipo.int/treaties/ip/index.html.  On moral 
rights, see Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Copyright and Moral Right:  Is an American 
Marriage Possible? 38 VAND. L. REV. 1 (1985); Jane C. Ginsburg, A Tale of Two 
Copyrights:  Literary Property in Revolutionary France and America, 64 TUL. L. 
REV. 991, 996 (1990); Henry Hansman & Marina Santilli, Authors’ and Artists’ 
Moral Rights:  A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis, 26 J. LEGAL STUD. 95 
(1997); Edward J. Damich, The Right of Personality:  A Common-Law Basis for the 
Protection of the Moral Rights of Authors, 23 GA. L. REV. 1 (1988).  Recent  
comparisons of American, French, and German approaches to moral rights include 
Dana Beldiman, Fundamental Rights, Author’s Right and Copyright – 
Commonalities or Divergences? 29 COLUM. J. L & ARTS 39 (2005) (reviewing 
CHRISTOPHE GEIGER, DROIT D’AUTEUR ET DROIT DU PUBLIC A L’INFORMATION – 
APPROCHE DE DROIT COMPARE (2004)), and Adolph Dietz, ALAI Congress:  
Antwerp 1993, the Moral Rights of the Author:  Moral Rights and the Civil Law 
Countries, 19 COLUM. –VLA J.L. & ARTS 199 (1995). 
48 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (a federal trademark is “a word, name, symbol, or device” used 
“to identify and distinguish” goods “from those manufactured or sold by others and 
to indicate the source of the goods”; a federal service mark is used to “identify and 
distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service, from the services 
of others and to indicate the source of the services”).   See generally ROBERT C. 
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functions as a form of attribution.  Trademark law explicitly recognizes both 
sides of the attribution problem:  false attributions can harm the true creator 
both by unjustly denying them the positive reputation effects of being 
associated with a good product (“passing off”) and by unjustly giving negative 
reputation effects of being wrongly associated with a bad product (“reverse 
passing off”).49  As will be explained below, all norms-based attribution 
regimes attempt to deal with the need to allocate credit and blame in proportion 
to contributions to avoid both passing off another’s work as one’s own and 
reverse passing off one’s own work as someone else’s. 
 
Until recently, trademark law had been developing a line of cases 
creating a right of attribution to published works.50  The Supreme Court put a 
stop to it in Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation when it 
held that there is no right of attribution for screen credit under the Lanham 
Act.51  Dastar held that a film whose copyright had expired could be sold 
without crediting the original “authors” of the work.  The original “authors” 
were, of course, not all the original creators of the film, they were owners of 
the expired copyright.  Intellectual property scholars have generally been 
critical of the absence of an attribution right even if not of the result in 
Dastar.52  
                                                                                                                   
DORR & CHRISTOPHER H. MUNCH, PROTECTING TRADE SECRETS, PATENTS, 
COPYRIGHTS, AND TRADEMARKS (3d ed. 2002). 
49 Indeed, this was part of the reasoning in the Court’s opinion in Dastar for finding 
no right of attribution.  According to the Court, Dastar would have faced a trademark 
suit whether or not it attributed the work.  The prior “author,” Twentieth Century Fox 
likely would have sued Dastar for reverse passing off (that is, selling the revised 
films as being Twentieth Century Fox’s) if Dastar had attributed the films to 
Twentieth Century Fox; as it happened, Dastar did not attribute the film and Fox 
sued passing off (failing to attribute).   Thus, in the Court’s view, the Lanham Act 
claim was an effort of Twentieth Century Fox to extend its control over the content 
of the programs beyond the expiration of the copyright; it was not really an effort to 
protect its reputation as a prior author of the work.  539 U.S. at 36.   
50 Jane C. Ginsburg, The Right to Claim Authorship in U.S. Copyright and 
Trademarks Law, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 263 (2004); Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, The 
Attribution Right in the United States:  Caught in the Crossfire Between Copyright 
and Section 43(a), 77 WASH. L. REV. 985 (2002). 
51 539 U.S. 23 (2003). The relevant provision of the Lanham Act is section 43(a), 15 
U.S.C. 1125(a), which prohibits the use of a “false designation of origin” in 
connection with the provision of “goods or services.” 
52 See Greg Lastowka, The Trademark Function of Authorship, 85 B.U. L. REV. 1171 
(2005); Jane C. Ginsburg, The Author’s Name as a Trademark:  A Perverse 
Perspective on the Moral Right of “Paternity,” 23 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 379 
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Generally speaking, United States copyright law does not require the 
author of a work to be identified.  There are two partial exceptions.  First, 
under the Visual Artists’ Rights Act of 1990 (VARA), a limited category of 
“recognized” visual artists have a waivable right of attribution for a “work of 
visual art,” which essentially includes paintings, drawings, prints, sculptures or 
photographs that exist in limited editions of 200 copies or less and are not 
works made for hire.53  Second, the multiple authors of joint works (defined by 
statute as a “work prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their 
contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parties of a unitary 
whole”) are entitled to control the uses of their work and thus are in a position 
to insist on attribution.54  Cases and scholarship on joint authorship note the 
difficulty of determining when collaborators on a collective work have made 
sufficiently significant contributions to be entitled to joint authorship, and 
under existing law it is extremely difficult for one collaborator to claim joint 
authorship without the express concurrence of other authors.55 
 
The credit function of inventor attribution is well established in patent 
law because of the longstanding requirement that a patent, to be valid, must 
correctly identify the true and original inventor.56  Scholars of patent law 
acknowledge, however, that, notwithstanding a body of law governing who 
                                                                                                                   
(2005); Jonathan Band & Matt Schruers, Dastar, Attribution and Plagiarism, 33 
AIPLAQJ 1 (2005). 
53 17 U.S.C. 106A (defining who are visual artists) 101 (defining works of visual art).  
See RayMing Chang, Revisiting the Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990:  A Follow Up 
Survey on Awareness and Waiver, 13 TEX. INTELL. PROP. J. 129 (2005) (an empirical 
examination of actual practices under VARA).  
54 17 U.S.C. 101. 
55 See, e.g., Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, “Author-Stories”:  Narrative’s Implications 
for Moral Rights and Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1 
(2002); Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research:  Conflicts on 
Authorship, Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV.  1161 (2000); F. Jay 
Dougherty, Not a Spike Lee Joint?  Joint Authorship of Motion Pictures, 49 UCLA 
L. REV. 225 (2001).  Leading cases include Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.2d 195 (2d 
Cir. 1998) (rejecting claim of dramaturg that she was joint author of Rent); Childress 
v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991); Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.2d 1227 (9th 
Cir. 2000) (rejecting joint authorship of motion picture); Seshadri v. Kasraian, 130 
F.3d 798 (7th Cir. 1997) (paper written by professor and student was joint work; 
relying on correspondence between the two persons and the listing of author names 
beginning with student’s).  
56 35 U.S.C. § 116-117; 37 C.F.R. §1.45 – 1.48.  A patent may be invalidated if the 
named inventor “did not himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented.”  35 
U.S.C. § 102(f). 
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qualifies as a true and original inventor, the attribution of invention is governed 
largely by norms.  Anecdotal reports suggest that the legal consequences of 
false attribution are invoked only when the norms-based system breaks down.   
 
Another partial attribution right is provided by the common law torts 
of publicity, false light privacy, and, to some extent, defamation.  The right of 
publicity protects the interest of celebrities to control the use of their name or 
likeness; the tort of invasion of privacy allows anyone to prevent their name or 
likeness to be used for commercial purposes or to portray them in a false light; 
and the tort of defamation prohibits false and damaging statements about a 
person.  The right of publicity, like trademark, focuses on names and on 
pictures or other representations of a person’s likeness.57  In that sense, it 
allows a person to be associated with the persona that her work creates.58  The 
law of defamation and false light privacy protect more generally a reputation, 
focusing not on the association of the name or likeness with a product but 
instead on the attribution of facts to the person.  All three of these torts can be 
seen to protect, at least in a general sense, the value of a person’s reputation 
and the right of people to control what actions or characteristics will be 
                                                 
57 The analogy between the right of publicity and moral rights is developed in 
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Preserving Personality and Reputational Interests of 
Constructed Personas Through Moral Rights:  A Blueprint for the Twenty-First 
Century, 2001 ILL. L. REV. 151.  A recent work urging greater reliance on the 
analogy between trademark law and the right of publicity is Stacey L. Dogan & Mark 
A. Lemley, What the Right of Publicity Can Learn from Trademark Law, available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=862965 (November 2005).  David Vaver has also remarked 
on the conceptual similarity of moral rights the torts of defamation and publicity 
under English law.  Moral Rights Yesterday, Today and Tomorrow, 7 INTL J.L. & 
INFO. TECH. 270, 271 (2000). 
58 Mark P. McKenna, The Right of Publicity and Autonomous Self-Definition, 67 
PITT. L. REV. __ (2005).  A few cases have upheld false light privacy claims brought 
by employees against their employers, though none in the context of a failure to 
credit or falsely blaming employee for work quality.  Shepards Pharmacy v. Stop & 
Shop Co., Inc., 640 N.E.2d 1112 (Mass. App. 1994) (employer appropriated 
plaintiff’s name and likeness in advertisement announcing purchase of plaintiff’s 
business and employment of plaintiff because the advertisement was made before the 
purchase and employment agreement were finalized); Negron v. Rexam Cosmetic 
Packaging, Inc., 2006 WL 240528 (Conn. Super. 2006) (rejecting false light privacy 
claim by employee against employer who posted photos of employee and his dog on 
a fishing trip because photos were not publicized outside the workplace); Aranyosi v. 
Delchamps, Inc., 739 So.2d 911 (La. App. 1999) (rejecting defamation and false light 
privacy claims for lack of evidence of malice); Aker v. New York and Co., Inc., 364 
F. Supp. 2d 661 (N.D. Ohio 2005) (allowing defamation claim in context of a public 
search of plaintiff’s person outside a retail store).  
  3/24/2006 
22                                                                         CATHERINE L. FISK 
attributed to them.  But none offers the kind of comprehensive protection for 
false attributions that make it difficult for some employees in some contexts to 
accurately portray their abilities and accomplishments.59  Moreover, the 
significant free speech concerns about these torts suggest that a radical 
expansion to generally protect reputation may not be desirable.60 
 
Employment agreements occasionally provide some form of 
attribution right, particularly when the agreement calls for the payment of a 
bonus upon achieving certain goals. Most states will enforce, through an action 
for breach of contract, an express employer promise to pay a bonus to an 
                                                 
59 See, e.g., John Ashby, Note, Employment References:  Should Employers Have an 
Affirmative Duty to Report Employee Misconduct to Inquiring Prospective 
Employers? 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 117 (2004) (critically examining the current law on 
defamation and failure to disclose problems in the context of references for former 
employees); J. Bradley Buckhalter, Speak No Evil:  Negligent Employment Referral 
and the Employer’s Duty to Warn (or, How Employers Can Have Their Cake and 
Eat It Too), 22 SEATTLE UNIV. L. REV. 265 (1998).  Notwithstanding the common 
perception that employers face possible defamation liability for giving negative 
references, a sampling of recent cases rejecting such claims makes clear that it is 
quite difficult to overcome the employer’s privilege to make false statements in the 
context of job references.  Noel v. River Hills Wilsons, Inc., 7 Cal. Rptr. 3d 216 (Cal. 
App. 2003) (rejecting claim because mere negligence is not enough to constitute 
malice necessary to lose privilege); Kenney v. Gilmore, 393 S.E.2d 472 (Ga. 1990) 
(granting employer defendant’s motion for summary judgment finding that 
defamatory statements in job reference were privileged); Lawrence v. Syms Corp., 
969 F. Supp. 1014 (E.D. Mich. 1997) (communication of former employee’s past 
work performance is privileged); Brunsman v. West Hills Country Club, 785 N.E.2d 
794 (Ohio App. 2003)(proof of actual malice to defeat privilege requires clear and 
convincing evidence that former employer acting out of spite made defamatory 
statements with knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of truth); Young v. 
Jackson, 572 So. 2d 378 (Mo. 1990) (employer permissibly revealed private health 
information about one employee to allay fears of other employees as to safety of 
working conditions); Welch v. Tellabs Operations, Inc., 2003 WL 22970992, 800 
N.E.2d 726 (table) (Mass. App. 2003) (unreported) (former employer privileged to 
give defamatory job reference because of public interest in providing legal protection 
against defamation claims in reference context). 
60 See, e.g., F. Jay Dougherty, All the World’s Not a Stooge?  The 
“Transformativeness” Test for Analyzing a First Amendment Defense to A Right of 
Publicity Claim Against Distribution of a Work of Art, 27 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1 
(2003); Gary Williams, On the QT and Very Hush, Hush: A Proposal to Extend 
California’s Right to Privacy to Protect Public Figures from Publication of 
Confidential Personal Information, 19 LOY. L.A. ENT. L.J. 337 (1999).   
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employee.61  However, courts often find that the entitlement to the bonus lies 
within the employer’s sole discretion, and therefore deny employee claims.62  
Bonus agreements are among the many areas where courts are unwilling to 
treat employment policies as binding contracts.  Because employment 
agreements tend to be informal, oral, and to change over time, judges tend to 
be skeptical about employee assertions about promises to pay bonuses for 
outstanding work, just as they are skeptical about promises of job security or 
fair disciplinary processes.63  
 
A variation on the express contract theory is the covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing, which is used when the employer did not breach a contract by 
failing to pay a bonus, but instead attempted to avoid the obligation to pay a 
bonus earned by firing the employee before the date on which the obligation to 
pay the bonus actually accrued.  A handful of cases have addressed this 
problem by finding breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
which some states recognize as an implied term in employment agreements.  
The classic case is Fortune v. National Cash Register Company, in which an at-
will salesman was entitled, under the terms of the company bonus agreement, 
to be paid a certain bonus for sales made within sales territory assigned to him 
                                                 
61 See, e.g., Ringle v. Bruton, 86 P.3d 1032 (Nev. 2004) (upholding a jury verdict 
awarding employee bonus under terms of express agreement); Kelly v. Stamps.Com, 
Inc., 2005 WL 3485644 (Cal. App. 2005) (unreported) (allows claim under 
California Labor Code that employee entitled to bonus earned under an express 
contract). 
62 See, e.g., Ferrand v. Credit Lyonnais, 2003 WL 22251313 (SDNY 2003) 
(collecting cases) (unreported), on reh’g 292 F. Supp. 2d 518 (SDNY 2003); Coats v. 
General Motors Corp., 3 Cal. App. 2d 340 (1934).  
63 A recent effort to address the poor fit between traditional contract doctrines and the 
evolving and informal nature of most employment agreements, see Robert C. Bird, 
Employment as a Relational Contract, 8 U. PA. J. LAB & EMP. L. 149 (2005). One 
complaint about bonus regimes, especially those in law firms or investment banks 
where the bonus is a substantial part of the compensation package, is a lack of 
transparency about the criteria used to measure performance and how they are 
applied in a particular case.  In an English case involving a media analyst who sued 
for employment discrimination, the employment appeal tribunal was reported to have 
said, “No tribunal should be seen to condone a City bonus culture involving secrecy 
and/or lack of transparency because of the potentially large amounts involved, as a 
reason for avoiding equal pay obligations.”   A reform proposed has been for banks 
and law firms to be more transparent about the criteria for awarding bonuses, as has 
allegedly been done in advertising and media industries, so that employees can both 
assess their own performance in light of management’s goals, and management is 
clearer in identifying its goals for employees.  Lina Saigol, City Braced for Litigation 
on Bonuses, FINANCIAL TIMES Feb. 2, 2006 at 2. 
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if the territory was assigned to him on the date of the order, a smaller bonus if 
the territory was assigned to him at the date of delivery and installation, and a 
larger bonus if the territory was assigned to him on both dates.64  A sale was 
made into Fortune’s territory and Fortune was fired before the date of delivery.  
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that if the company fired 
Fortune in order to avoid paying him the bonus due on the date of delivery, it 
breached the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in Fortune’s 
employment agreement, even though, as an at will employee, Fortune could 
have been fired for good, bad or no reason.65 
 
The extant cases, like Fortune, take as established that the employee 
either was or was not entitled to the bonus.  No cases have recognized the 
problematic nature of the determination whether the bonus was earned.  
Perhaps this is because the only cases litigated are the ones where the bonus 
agreement was explicit and where the criteria for determining whether the 
employee had earned the bonus were sufficiently clear and objective so as to 
make a strong case that the employee had performed up to the standard.  Apart 
from these cases in which employees have entered into a contract expressly 
requiring attribution as part of a bonus program, there is no recognized contract 
right to attribution.   
                                                 
64 Fortune v. National Cash Register Co., 364 N.E.2d 1251 (Mass. 1977). 
65 Other cases recognizing availability of a covenant of good faith and fair dealing 
claim to prevent actions that would deprive an employee of an earned bonus include 
Magilione v. Aegis Family Health Ctrs, 607 S.E.2d 286 (N.C. App. 2005) 
(recognizing claim for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing when 
employer changed bonus calculation method in a manner that prevented employee 
from receiving a bonus per an express bonus agreement); Lopresti v. Rutland 
Regional Health Servs, Inc., 865 A.2d 1102 (Vt. 2004) (covenant of good faith and 
fair dealing would provide claim for accrued bonus benefits but no such claim exists 
on the facts, though employee does have claim for termination in violation of public 
policy); A. Brod, Inc. v. Worldwide Dreams, LLC, 791 N.Y.S.2d 867 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2004) (unpublished) (covenant of good faith and fair dealing can be used to 
challenge actions short of firing that prevent a party from receiving benefits under 
contract, but cannot duplicate claims for breach of contract). Other states do not 
recognize the covenant in employment agreements, although in most cases the rejection 
of the covenant is a rejection of an effort to use an implied contract theory when the 
court has found no express contract to exist. See, e.g., Buist v. Van Haren Elec., Inc., 
2004 WL 2291354 (Mich. App. 2004) (unreported) (rejecting claim for breach of 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing in connection with alleged breach of bonus 
agreement; court found no express agreement and relies on earlier Michigan 
decisions rejecting applicability of covenant of good faith and fair dealing in 
employment context); Barber v. SMH (US), Inc., 509 N.W. 2d 791 (Mich. App. 
1993)). 
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B. Assessing Attribution Regimes 
 
In this section, I posit and defend criteria that should be used to assess 
the operation of an attribution regime.  Inasmuch as norms-based attribution 
regimes create and define valuable rights, one can assess them in the same in 
the same fashion as a public law regime of rights.  The vast literature on the 
value of fairness and due process in governance, as well as the theoretical and 
empirical studies of the benefits of procedural fairness and participatory 
governance in the workplace, suggest that some combination of the following 
six criteria be used in assessing a workplace attribution regime.66  
 
Transparency.  For the same reasons that most legal systems are and 
should be relatively transparent -- laws are known and courts are public -- the 
credit system should be too.  The criteria for granting credit should be 
relatively transparent or publicly known.  Transparency motivates people to do 
the work to earn credit and enables people to conform their conduct so as to 
avoid blame.  The process by which the criteria will be applied should be 
known or at least discoverable by the people to whom the system applies 
unless, as explained below, there are good reasons for secrecy.  
 
 Third parties may also have an interest in relatively transparent criteria 
for allocating credit.  To the extent that the economic value of credit is a signal, 
the signal will be less effective (and therefore less efficient) if there is 
uncertainty about the significance of credit.  In other words, the third-party 
benefit of credit is informational, and muddiness of the signal undermines the 
value. 
 
 Participation.  Some degree of participation in a governance process is 
beneficial both intrinsically and instrumentally.  Instrumentally, it is often 
likely to produce accuracy as to facts.  The people who have the best 
information about the abilities and accomplishments of workers are the 
                                                 
66 The value of process generally is discussed in Robert S. Summers, Evaluating and 
Improving Legal Processes – A Plea for ‘Process Values’, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1 
(1974).  The value of fair process in the workplace is explored in PHILIP SELZNICK, 
LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969); Tom R. Tyler & Stephen L. Blader, 
The Group Engagement Model:  Procedural Justice, Social Identity, and 
Cooperative Behavior, 7 PERSONALTY & SOC. PSYCOLOGY REV. 349 (2003); E. 
ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 
(1988); TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS:  
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, SOCIAL IDENTITY, AND BEHAVIORAL ENGAGEMENT (2000). 
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workers themselves.  Effective unions are thought to contribute to productivity 
because they institutionalize a mechanism for information sharing in the 
workplace about the creation and use of tacit knowledge as well as safety 
issues or cost-saving techniques.67  Participation of workers is likely to protect 
legitimacy of the system and the appearance of fairness that are necessary to 
employee motivation.  Participation has intrinsic value as well.  A basic insight 
of the literature on democracy generally, and workplace democracy in 
particular, is that participation in governance is intrinsically valued, even if it 
does not lead to better decisions.68 
 
 Equality.  The equality value applies in the articulation of criteria for 
credit:  in the same workplace it seems desirable that if hours worked matters, 
they matter equally for all, or if the importance of ideas contributed matters, 
they matter equally for all contributors.  Equality also applies to the application 
of the criteria:  if credit is to be given according to effort, it should not be 
reserved only for the boss’s current lover.  Equality in the criteria and their 
application will motivate people; arbitrary granting of credit will often act as a 
disincentive to effort.  Equality also benefits third parties by enhancing the 
clarity of the signal conveyed by the attribution.  It helps when reading journal 
articles with multiple authors to know that the first author listed is always the 
primary researcher, the most senior member of the research team, or the person 
whose last name begins with the first letter in the alphabet. 
 
Due Process.  Due process refers primarily to the processes used to 
resolve disputes regarding attribution.  Whereas participation refers primarily 
to involvement of people in the quasi-legislative process of determining the 
credit criteria, the due process value refers to the involvement of the competing 
claimants in the quasi-adjudicative process of resolving disputes about the 
application of criteria in a particular case.  
 
The basic elements of due process are notice, a hearing, and a 
requirement that an unbiased and competent person make a decision based on 
evidence.  An appropriate process could address some of the bias problems in 
attribution.  To do that, the process would need to begin before or at the same 
time the creative process begins, at least by putting the participants on notice of 
the need to be cognizant of the attribution issues that may arise in their 
collaboration.  Of course plans for how the parties think they might resolve the 
                                                 
67 See Paul Osterman, The Wage Effects of High Performance Work Organization in 
Manufacturing, 59 INDUS. & LAB. RELS. REV. 187 (2006); RICHARD FREEMAN & 
JAMES MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS DO? (1984). 
68 As to the value of workplace participation, see RICHARD FREEMAN & JOEL 
ROGERS, WHAT WORKERS WANT (1999). 
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attribution issues might be subject to revision as the process continues and 
again when it concludes, once everyone knows who wound up actually doing 
which parts of the work.  The challenge would be to marry an awareness of the 
significance of attribution to the flexibility and generosity that makes ideal 
collaboration possible. 
 
Efficiency.  All four of the process values identified above – 
transparency, participation, equality, and due process – can be expensive to 
achieve.  Efficiency asks whether the benefits to be gained from improving the 
system are worth the costs that will be imposed.  The basic idea is that where 
credit determinations are enormously valuable and do not happen terribly 
frequently (as in the case of screen credit in a major motion picture), it may be 
worth investing significant resources in getting it right.  For credit 
determinations that happen daily in a firm or frequently in the life of a person, 
and where the economic and social benefits of credit (or costs, in the case of 
blame) are correspondingly less likely to be large in any particular instance, it 
may not make sense for the group to spend substantial resources in getting it 
right.  Thus, choosing the employee of the week in the local supermarket may 
require less process than choosing who is the lead author of a lead article in a 
leading academic journal. 
 
 Substantive Fairness.  Perhaps the most difficult to capture but most 
elemental notion of a just attribution system is one that gives credit where it is 
due. The substantive fairness value connotes the idea that credit should bear 
some relationship to the value of the contribution, whether that is measured in 
terms of the number of hours worked or the value of the ideas contributed.  It 
applies in articulating criteria for how credit should be attributed:  it would be 
unfair to say that only people born on Tuesday are eligible for screen credit. 
The problem is defining when credit is “due.”  In some cases, it seems 
perfectly acceptable for one’s boss to take credit for the work of subordinates.  
When a politician gives a brilliant speech, no one feels it unjust that the 
politician does not remind the world that the speechwriter deserves the credit.  
When a company scores a major sale, the person in charge of the deal may not 
offend anyone’s sensibility by receiving the congratulations of the CEO for 
closing the deal.  And yet in other contexts, it may be wrong to fail to give 
credit.  At the celebratory party after the deal is signed, it may indeed be poor 
form not to acknowledge the members of the team who worked long hours to 
bring it about.  If the speechwriter seeks a reference to get another job, it may 
be outrageous, or even a breach of an implicit contract, for the politician to 
deny that the speechwriter wrote (or worked on) the speech.  Context is 
everything in determining when credit is due.  In addition, norms of substantive 
fairness change.  As described below, it used to be conventional in advertising 
  3/24/2006 
28                                                                         CATHERINE L. FISK 
for the person in charge of an ad campaign to take the credit for it at annual 
awards ceremonies; now it appears to be conventional to give credit to a large 
number of contributors to the campaign. 
 
 C. Contemporary Attribution Norms and Processes 
 
 Bearing those assessment criteria in mind, consider the operation of 
attribution schemes in five disparate areas of the economy:  Hollywood, 
academic and scientific publishing, business, politics, and the professions.  I 
chose these five areas because collectively they cover a large segment of the 
economy and individually they are sufficiently distinct from one another to 
give a fair sense of the variety of attribution regimes that exist.  Each of these 
areas relies primarily on non-legal norms, with a modest degree of legal 
backup, to create and administer credit systems.  All value accurate attribution 
in some contexts, thus suggesting widespread adherence to a norm of 
attribution.  In the more formal systems, the “right” of attribution operates 
much like intellectual property rights; in the less formal systems it seems a 
stretch even to call it a norms-based intellectual property system as much as 
simply an effort to motivate workers through humane personnel practices or 
civil interpersonal relations.   
 
1. Hollywood 
 
 Hollywood (both motion picture and television production) has a 
highly formal credit system that is thoroughly infused with legally enforceable 
rules.  There are elaborate and legally enforceable rules for granting screen 
credit.  The rules govern whose name will appear and whose will not, and there 
are rules governing who can be listed under which job title (director, 
screenplay by, key grip, etc.) and the order and size of the print in which names 
are listed.  The credit rules are the subject of negotiations between the guilds 
representing various workers and the production companies, but currently the 
administration of credit is left entirely to the guilds representing each of the 
forms of talent.  One of the most important things that Hollywood guilds do is 
to administer the credit system.69   
                                                 
69 See Dougherty, supra note 55; Lastowka, supra note 52; Robert Davenport, Screen 
Credit in the Entertainment Industry, 10 Loy. Ent. L.J. 129 (1990); Robert L. 
Gordon, Giving the Devil Its Due:  Actors’ and Performers’ Right to Receive 
Attribution for Cinematic Roles, 4 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 299 (1985); Michael H. 
Davis, The Screenwriter’s Indestructible Right to Terminate Her Assignment of 
Copyright:  Once a Story is “Pitched,” A Studio Can Never Obtain All Copyrights in 
the Story, 18 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 93 (2000); Stuart K. Kauffman, Motion 
Pictures, Moral Rights, and the Incentive Theory of Copyright:  The Independent 
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 Notwithstanding the formality and legally enforceable nature of screen 
credit rights, informal norms also play a significant role.  Producer credits, one 
of the most important on a movie, are not governed by collective bargaining 
agreements because the studios do not recognize the Producers Guild as a 
union.  Therefore, some (including a producer of the 2006 Academy Award 
winning movie Crash) complain that producer screen credits are accorded by 
the Producers Guild unfairly.70 Because the guild agreements limit the number 
of people who can be credited in some roles on any one film, power relations 
among various possible contenders for credit affect who is listed.  Individual 
workers with significant bargaining power (actors, directors, writers, and 
producers) negotiate for specific treatment on each project, which may or may 
not reflect the same level of artistic contribution as compared to others who 
receive a similar type of credit on a different film or who receive the same 
credit (or no credit) on the same film.71  For example, some screenwriters 
complain that the credit system for screenplays is not sufficiently transparent 
and favors successful writers at the expense of those without established 
reputations.72   In addition, some complain about the rules for allocating credit 
between first writers and rewriters, and between directors and producers on the 
one hand and writers on the other.   
 
In addition, some contributors to a project (lawyers, caterers, and 
others) may be credited even though they are not subject to guild agreements 
providing for credit.  They may negotiate for credit in the contract in which 
they agree to work on the project, or they may be given credit at the whim of 
                                                                                                                   
Film Producer as “Author,” 17 Cardozo Arts & Ent. L.J. 749 (1999).  Leading cases 
on screen credits include:  Marino v. Writers’ Guild of America East, Inc., 992 F.2d 
1480 (9th Cir. 1993); Baer v. Chase, 392 F.3d 609 (3d Cir. 2004); Williams v. UMG 
Recordings, Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (C.D. Cal. 2003).   
70 Bob Yari, a producer of Crash, has sued the Academy of Motion Picture Arts and 
Sciences, seeking an injunction that producer credits be determined using a 
transparent and fair process akin to those used to grant writing and directing credits.  
See Peter Guber, Op-Ed, The Producers, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2006, at 15. 
71 The WGA agreement, which allows individual writers to negotiate for terms better 
than the collectively bargained minimum, specifically prohibits separate deals for 
screen credit.  The negotiation for screen credit happens in the interstices of the 
system established by the WGA, not in derogation of it.  See WGA 2001 Basic 
Agreement, Art. 9.  
72 Michael Alan Eddy sued the WGA over its refusal to allow Eddy to participate in 
the credit arbitration for The Last Samurai.  The federal judge dismissed the suit in 
October 2004 on the ground that the guild has wide discretion in credit 
administration.  Dave McNary, Calmer Seas in New Year Daily Variety, Feb. 18, 
2005, at A2.  
  3/24/2006 
30                                                                         CATHERINE L. FISK 
the producer or director as a form of thanks.  There are significant differences 
in the processes of credit attribution for star actors, directors, producers, and 
writers than for the best boys, grips, set painters, and still another set of norms 
governing credit for caterers, assistants, lawyers, and accountants. 
 
The Writers Guild of America (WGA), the union representing 12,000 
writers, administers the credit system for screenwriters.  The collective 
bargaining agreement between the WGA and the Alliance of Motion Picture & 
Television Producers states that “credits for screen authorship shall be given 
only pursuant to the terms of and in the manner prescribed in” the Theatrical 
Schedule A, a thirty-page addendum to the Basic Agreement.  Theatrical 
Schedule A specifies the criteria for screen credit.  Disputes over credit are 
resolved pursuant to the WGA Credits Manual, which is not part of Theatrical 
Schedule A but is approved by the WGA’s board of directors and by a vote of 
the WGA membership.73  The WGA has a committee that decides which names 
to submit to the studios to list as screenwriters.  Theatrical Schedule A prohibits 
screen credit to more than two writers “except that in unusual cases, and solely 
as a result of arbitration,” three writers or “two writing teams” (each of which 
can be no more than two writers) may be credited.74 It also states, however, that 
the writers may agree among themselves as to screen credit if they agree 
unanimously and so long as the number of credited writers and the form of 
credit are consistent with Schedule A.75  Writers who disagree with the Guild’s 
determination can seek arbitration.  In 2002, 67 of 210 feature film writing 
credits were arbitrated.76  The WGA is considering the possibility of including 
“noncredited writers” in the end credits even if they are not listed in the 
opening credits as the writers of the screenplay.77     
 
As compared to some other credit systems, the Hollywood system 
rates fairly high in terms of transparency, participation, equality, and due 
process.  Transparency is relatively high because the rules are written down, 
and disputes over credit are covered in the press.  Some degree of transparency 
is likely to ensure both the fact and the appearance of fairness and regularity.  It 
is not entirely transparent, however.  The identity of the WGA arbiters and the 
                                                 
73 See Marino v. Writers Guild of Am., East, Inc., 992 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(describing WGA arbitration procedures). 
74 Theatrical Schedule A paragraph 4. 
75 Id. Paragraph 7. 
76 Dave McNary, Credit Issues, DAILY VARIETY, Dec. 18, 2003 at A10. 
77 Id. See also Zorianna Kit, Everyone Wants to Take Credit, THE HOLLYWOOD 
REPORTER, Mar. 30, 1999 (describing the credit system for producers which. because 
the Producers Guild is not a recognized union and has no contract with the studios, 
operates without contractual constraint).  
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names of writers in credit arbitrations are both kept secret.  There are good 
reasons for this; arbiters are insulated from pressure and the anonymity of 
claimants helps ensure that decisions are not affected by favoritism.      
 
Participation is high because the right to establish the rules is 
collectively bargained between the producers and the guild.  The rules for 
allocating credit and for resolving disputes about it are developed by the guild, 
approved by the guild’s board, and voted on by entire guild membership.  
Equality and fairness are fairly high, at least at a formal level, because the 
arbitration process aims to ensure that screenwriting credit is given in 
proportion to the size and significance of contributions, and the small number 
of arbitrators who do these cases tends to result in consistency across cases.  In 
practice, however, a lack of equality is one of the most common complaints 
about the system.  Due process is high because there is a three-step arbitration 
process.  Because the system costs significant time and effort, the credit system 
seems to work only for those contributors (directors, producers, writers, and 
actors) for whom the financial value of credit is large enough to make it 
economically sensible to invoke the whole cumbersome process.   
 
The credit system for others seems to be more governed by norms, 
charity, and power than by law, although there may be some way in which 
allocation is done in the shadow of the law because of a culture of regularity (if 
one exists) and the possibility that a guild will make noise about it.  Stop-
motion animator Mike Jittlov had a contract with Disney that provided no 
credit to him as an animator.  So he spelled out his name in the parade of 
marching toys that he animated.78  Also the system depends on existence of 
guilds and sophisticated lawyers on both sides both in the negotiating of guild 
agreements and in negotiating individual contracts – repeat players.  In short, 
the screen credit system in Hollywood for most contributors looks rather unlike 
the credit system in other industries. 
 
2. Science and Medicine 
 
Attribution in the physical and biological sciences, as well as in the 
social sciences, exhibits many of the same the same characteristics one sees in 
Hollywood.  Attribution is valuable and is explicitly recognized by everyone to 
be divorced from intellectual property ownership.  Large-scale collaborations 
are common, and there is a perceived need to have rules and processes for 
attribution that are more or less uniform throughout the “industry,” so to speak.  
It is not enough, that is, for each university or laboratory to have its own 
                                                 
78 Russell Kay, Easter Eggs, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 18, 2000. 
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attribution system; the attributions are relied on and therefore must be reliable 
to outsiders throughout the field.79   
 
Science and medicine use several formal and informal methods of 
attributing work.  The problem of attributing authorship and credit in science 
has recently gained significant attention within scientific communities and 
among scholars of intellectual property and related fields.80  One reason 
scientific attribution has received so much attention is that in the scientific field 
intellectual property rights and attribution rights are so clearly separate.  Unlike 
popular books, films, magazines, or most other copyrighted works, scientific 
publications (like much academic writing) are usually far less valuable as 
intellectual property than as claims to truth.  In addition, most university and 
corporate scientists who develop patented inventions have agreed as a 
condition of employment to assign the patent to their employer or funding 
source.  Thus, the value of scientific authorship is widely recognized to be in 
the attribution, not in the intellectual property.  Because the value of attribution 
is great, attribution has gained attention.  But in science, unlike in other 
academic fields, a large amount of the work is collaborative, and so the need 
for and difficulty of making attribution are great as well.  
 
 As collaborative research mushroomed in the late twentieth century, 
the listing of authors and contributors in articles published in scientific journals 
was perceived, at least by journal editors, as in something of a crisis in the 
early 1980s, and it prompted an effort to change and regularize the norms of 
attribution.81  Science thus offers a unique case study of the failure of one set of 
attribution norms and an attempt to replace them with new norms and more 
enforcement.  The list of perceived problems that led to the change is long but 
it is important to consider it in some detail.  Among the problems were disputes 
over whom to include as authors, and in what order.  More significant from the 
                                                 
79 See generally CORYNNE MCSHERRY, WHO OWNS ACADEMIC WORK?  BATTLING 
FOR CONTROL OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY (2001). 
80 See generally Biagioli, Documents of Documents, supra note 31; BIAGIOLI & 
GALISON, supra note 16; Arti Kaur Rai, Regulating Scientific Research:  Intellectual 
Property Rights and the Norms of Science, 94 NORTHWESTERN L. REV. 77 (1999). 
81 On the increase in collaboration, see Blaise Cronin, Debora Shaw & Kathryn La 
Barre, A Cast of Thousands:  Coauthorship and Subauthorship Collaboration in the 
20th Century as Manifested in the Scholarly Journal Literature of Psychology and 
Philosophy, 54 J. AM. SOCY INFO. SCI. & TECH. 855 (2003); Blaise Cronin, Debora 
Shaw & Kathryn La Barre, Visible, Less Visible, and Invisible Work:  Patterns of 
Collaboration in 20th Century Chemistry, 55 J. AM. SOCY INFO SCI. & TECH. 160 
(2004).  On the problems of too many authors, see Kim A. McDonald, Too Many Co-
Authors? CHRON. HIGHER ED., Apr. 28, 1995 at A35. 
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standpoint of third parties was the inconsistency of the significance of the order 
of listing from one institution to another prevented one from using the order of 
author names as evidence of the degree of contribution.82  Another problem 
was scientists faking data then including another scientist as a “guest author” to 
improve credibility.  Relatedly, journal editors were concerned that companies 
were paying academics to put their name on studies conducted by the 
companies’ researchers.  A more serious though less prevalent problem was 
that no one knew whom among dozens of authors to hold accountable for 
incorrect or fraudulent results; even legitimate co-authors could not guarantee 
the integrity of other authors’ work on the project.  From the standpoint of 
universities and funding sources, a large number of authors made it difficult to 
detect when the same research was published multiple times with different 
authors listed, and academic promotion committees had a hard time evaluating 
scholars based on number of publications rather than amount of work done.  
Junior scholars and graduate students complained about not getting any credit 
when only the senior researchers’ names were put on publications;83 In 
addition, there were concerns that researchers needed to disclose both their role 
in published studies and the funding source for the study in order to prevent 
drug companies from both designing studies likely to favor the companies’ 
products and suppressing unfavorable results of studies.84  
 
Responding to these concerns, and in particular to scandals having to 
do with fraudulent data, the International Committee of Medical Journal 
Editors (ICMJE) published a set of criteria for listing authors of papers 
published, and for ordering names in the case of multiple authors.85  The 
success of the new rules in changing practices regarding listing authors and 
other contributors is still being studied.86  What is clear is that the new rules 
                                                 
82 See David W. Shapiro, Neil S. Wenger & Martin F. Shapiro, The Contributions of 
Authors to Multiauthored Biomedical Research Papers, 271 JAMA 438 (1994) (“the 
nature or extent of contributions of authors cannot be reliably discerned by 
authorship or order of authorship”). 
83 Drummond Rennie, Veronica Yank, Linda Emanuel, When Authorship Fails:  A 
Proposal to Make Contributors Accountable, 278 JAMA 579 (1997).  See also 
Thomas Bodenheimer, Uneasy Alliance:  Clinical Investigators and the 
Pharmaceutical Industry, 342 NEW ENGLAND J. MED. 1539 (2000). 
84 Richard Smith, Maintaining the Integrity of the Scientific Record, 323 BRITISH 
MED. J. 588 (2001). 
85 Rennie, Yank & Emanuel, supra note 83; Biagioli, The Instability of Authorship, 
supra note 31. 
86 Seong Su Hwang et al., Researcher Contributions and Fulfillment of ICMJE 
Authorship Criteria:  Analysis of Author Contribution Lists in Resarch Articles with 
Multiple Authors Published in Radiology, 226 RADIOLOGY 16 (2003); Tamara Bates, 
et al., Authorship Criteria and Disclosure of Contributions:  Comparison of Three 
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changed some norms of acknowledgement and authorship and improved the 
clarity and consistency of attribution criteria.87   
 
Although the norms of attribution in scientific publishing have been 
formalized to increase transparency and equality, attribution through eponymy 
remains ad hoc.  There is the Salk polio vaccine, Fermat’s theorem, Boyle’s 
law, Krohn’s disease, and the innumerable stars, plants, and other natural things 
or phenomena named for their inventor or discoverer. Although studies of the 
eponymous discovery phenomenon suggest some arbitrariness in the naming 
process, discoveries have tended to be named for the researcher who:  (1) made 
the first reported observations of the phenomenon or filed the first case reports 
or disease descriptions of the condition; (2) related isolated cases to one 
disease, or recognized isolated phenomena as being part of one phenomenon; 
(3) spent years of study and observation on the same phenomenon; (4) 
developed a new procedure; (5) already was famous or prominent in the field; 
or (5) described his or her own condition.88   
 
The new rules for authorship in biomedical journals go some distance 
toward achieving transparency, equality, efficiency, and substantive fairness.  
There is some reason to believe that senior researchers still have substantial 
and unreviewable discretion whether to credit junior scholars, graduate 
students and postdocs, and thus abuses may remain.  While there is no 
evidence that all interested groups were represented in the development of the 
criteria, and thus participation at that level was low, there remain of course 
possibilities for individuals to negotiate for credit on a case-by-case basis.  
 
3. Business 
 
                                                                                                                   
General Medical Journals with Different Author Contribution Forms, 292 J. AM. 
MED. ASSN. No. 1 (2004).  There are also studies of authorship patterns for journals 
not covered by the new rules.  J.E. Bird, Authorship Patterns in Marine Mammal 
Science, 1985-1993, 39 SCIENTOMETRICS 99 (1997); Cronin, Shaw & La Barre, A 
Cast of Thousands, supra note 81. 
87 There have been recent studies of acknowledgement (as opposed to citation or 
authorship) practices to identify the significance of acknowledgement as a form of 
scientific contribution.   C. Lee Giles & Isaac G. Councill, Who Gets Acknowledged:  
Measuring Scientific Contributions Through Automatic Acknowledgement Indexing, 
101 PNAS 17599 (Dec. 21, 2004), available at 
www.pnas.org/cgi/doi/10.1073/pnas.0407743101. 
88 Michael S. Okun, Neurological Eponyms – Who Gets the Credit? 12 J. HIST. 
NEUROSCIENCES 91 (2003). 
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 Businesses attribute credit in collaborative projects to identify, 
motivate, and reward productive, creative, and diligent employees.  A number 
of generalizations about the nature of credit can be made here; details about the 
differences among industries are explored below.  Rewards are usually in the 
form of money or promotion.  Indeed, monetary bonuses and promotions are 
sometimes seen as proof of the existence of the contribution rather than as 
rewarding a contribution whose existence was proven on other grounds.89  The 
bonus thus has a value, beyond the amount of the money paid, as a marker of 
accomplishment.  Non-monetary rewards are sometimes given:  Some firms, 
particularly in low-wage sectors, publicly praise the “Employee of the Week.”  
The work of manufacturing employees is sometimes acknowledged to the 
public by stamping the employee’s name on the product (which used to be 
common on the bottom of paper bags) or in a package insert saying something 
like “This product was assembled/inspected by Lucy X.” Many firms have 
annual awards ceremonies.  Valued employees are singled out for praise in 
newsletters or over the company email system.  Annual performance appraisals 
of employees are often used to acknowledge good work.  All of these 
nonmonetary forms of credit are valuable both intrinsically and as signals of 
underlying value. 
 
 Corporate attribution processes vary widely.  When firms pay bonuses 
in cash, ranging from the relatively modest sums to large payments, or give 
stock options, they typically create some form of regularized process for 
gathering information about employee performance. The criteria are typically 
publicized to employees and efforts are made to achieve at least the appearance 
of even-handedness and a fair process.  Some attributions operate entirely 
internal to the firm, like the Kodak reward system.  Others operate on an 
industry-wide basis.  When bonuses are substantial, as is the case in law firms 
and investment banks, there is sometimes litigation when a firm declines to 
pay.  In one case in which the hiring letter from a Japanese bank to a senior 
equities trader promised a “discretionary bonus scheme which is not 
guaranteed in any way,” and later fired the trader without paying a bonus 
notwithstanding that he had earned substantial profits for the company, the 
English High Court awarded damages of 1.35 million pounds.  The court 
explained that the refusal to pay “was plainly perverse and irrational and did 
                                                 
89 Terry Besser, Rewards and Organizational Goal Achievement:  A Case Study of 
Toyota Motor Manufacturing in Kentucky, 32 J. MGT. STUDIES 383 (1995); Allan 
Halcrow, We’ve Listened … & Learned, 76 WORKFORCE 152 (1997); Bobbi 
Lambert, Give Your Company a Checkup, 74 PERSONNEL J. 143 (1995); J. Michael 
Crant & Thomas S. Bateman, Assignment of Credit and Blame for Performance 
Outcomes, 36 ACAD. MGT. J. 1 (1993). 
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not comply with the terms of the employer’s discretion.”90 Such cases are rare 
because few employees are paid enough to make a bonus worth litigating over.  
Consequently, attribution systems in most businesses remain largely outside the 
purview of law. Examples of the operation of several different attribution 
systems in different sectors of the economy follow. 
 
 Graphic Design and Advertising 
 
Industry-wide attribution systems exist in the fields of graphic design 
and advertising.  Both sectors use credit in a way that emulates screen credit, 
although the process for attribution is a less systematic and less transparent 
than in Hollywood, and is not the product of formal negotiations between 
management and employee representatives.  As in Hollywood, projects in 
graphic design and advertising tend to be collaborative, with many people 
contributing ideas, technical skills, and work to produce a finished product.  In 
the past in graphic design, the annual industry honors for outstanding work (the 
graphic design equivalent of the Oscars) usually attributed the entire work to 
one star designer, the head of the design company, or to the company itself.  
Recently, design annuals have tended to contain long credit listings similar to 
screen credits in a film.  Editors of the annuals who publish graphic design 
works compile a hierarchical list of contributors.  Originally the lists were 
limited to art directors, designers, photographers, and illustrators, but recently 
they have grown to include printers, paper manufacturers, copywriters, clients, 
film separators, and even font designers.91 
 
 Similarly, advertising firms have begun crediting more contributions 
than was common in the past.  When a new advertising spot is released or 
submitted for an award, the agency that produced it submits a formal credit list.  
The industry practice is for the director of the group that developed the ad to 
approve the credit list.  Creative directors acknowledge that giving credit is 
subjective. Inclusion on the credit list is important for job advancement, as a 
standard procedure in a job interview is to show a book of ad campaigns on 
which the applicant is credited.  The expansion in who is credited, however, 
can undermine the utility of the credit list; if the contributions of too many 
people are listed, the ability to determine the extent of the contributions of any 
one of them is compromised and people may conclude that any particular 
                                                 
90 Lina Saigol, City Braced for Litigation on Bonuses, FINANCIAL TIMES, Feb. 2, 
2006 at 2. 
91 Zuzana Licko &  Rudy VanderLans, Sins of Omission, 51 PRINT 20 (1997). 
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person’s contribution was insignificant.  As a consequence, word of mouth 
remains an important way of verifying claims to credit.92 
 
 An absence of empirical studies of credit in these fields makes it 
difficult to assess how well the systems operate.  A lack of transparency and 
participation by low-level employees suggest that there are a number of ways 
in which credit in both graphic design and advertising can be misallocated.  It 
is difficult to verify contributions, the incentives for opportunism are great, and 
even people acting entirely in good faith may have difficulty identifying who 
did what on a project.  It is unclear how well known the criteria for granting 
credit are, whether they are relatively uniform, and uniformly followed, across 
or within firms, and how much input employees have into defining and 
applying the criteria.  Thus it is difficult to assess how the systems rate in terms 
of equality and due process.  On the other hand, it may be that the informality 
and flexibility allow the system to operate efficiently by calibrating the degree 
of process in making credit determinations to the value of the credit in a 
particular case.     
 
 Software and Information Technology 
 
 Many ways in which firms reward their employees generally are found 
among computer and information technology businesses.  They use credit to 
motivate employees, to reward employees for particular contributions, and to 
identify talent for internal promotion.  Credit also serves as a form of 
credentialing that facilitates firms’ assessment of job applicants from outside 
the firm.93  Among the most common ways of acknowledging and rewarding 
work are praise, gift certificates, bonuses for specific tasks or efforts, attention 
from upper management, awards ceremonies, including the IT department in 
important projects, stock options, and profit-sharing.94 
                                                 
92 See Joan Voight, When Credit Is Not Due, 45 ADWEEK 24 (2004). 
93 See Julia Vowler & Bill Goodwin, Supplier Certification Can Give You an Edge, 
COMPUTER WKLY., Dec. 4, 2004, at 37; Jeff Moad, Techies Plug in to Hot Skills, 
EWEEK, Apr. 9, 2001, at 64; Jeff Moad, Solving the Cert Puzzle, EWEEK, Mar. 17, 
2003, at 49; Jeff Moad, IT Pros Flock to PM Certifications, EWEEK, Mar. 17, 2003, 
at 52; Joanna Bean, Colorado Springs, Colo., Experts Publish Software-Help Books, 
GAZETTE  (Colorado Springs), Dec. 19, 1999. 
94 PETER S. COHAN, THE TECHNOLOGY LEADERS 40 (1997); Thomas Hoffman, DHL 
Program Seeks to Hold On to IT Staff, COMPUTERWORLD, Jan. 17, 2005, at 1; Stacy 
Collett, Round-the-Clock IT: Making the Balance Work, COMPUTERWORLD, June 14, 
2004, at 32; Mary Brandel, 100 Best Places to Work in IT, June 14, 2004, 
COMPUTERWORLD, June 14, 2004, at 21; Jason Snyder, 2005 InfoWorld 
Compensation Survey, INFOWORLD, June 13, 2005, at 39, available at 
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 Software developers, unlike some other information technology 
professionals, are hired to construct creative works.  With a few exceptions, 
programmers who write software for their company to sell generally are not 
credited outside the company, in part to prevent competitors from luring away 
employees.95  Internally, however, credit is given for a variety of purposes.  
Source code comments are text added to the program’s code to help the people 
who will maintain the code.  It is considered good programming practice for 
the person who writes a piece of code to put their name in a comment in the 
source, and for subsequent programmers who modify the source to include 
their names with the date and description of their changes.96  Companies use 
credit as well as opportunities for employees to pursue their own ideas to 
encourage innovation.97  Credit is so important that subversive claims to it it 
are sometimes made.  Computer programmers are known to hide amusing 
screens called “Easter eggs” in their software, often listing the people who 
wrote the software.98  
                                                                                                                   
 http://www.infoworld.com/article/05/06/13/24FEcompsurvey_1.html. 
95 Josh Lerner & Jean Tirole, Some Simple Economics of Open Source Software, 50 
J. INDUS. ECON. 197, 223-24 (2002).  Adobe Acrobat 6.0 is one exception.  Choosing 
“About Adobe Reader 6.0” from the Help menu leads to a screen where the user can 
see the list of everyone who worked on the product, from engineering to marketing. 
See also Stuart Roch, The New Studio Model – A Search for Studiotopia, GAME 
DEVELOPER, Oct. 1, 2004, at 16 (“Very often, [video game developers’] work is 
hidden from view by publishers fearful of recruiters and competitive studios”); 
Tamara Chuang, Video-Game Trailblazers Remember First Heyday of Home 
Entertainment Trend, ORANGE COUNTY REG.,  Feb. 23, 2004 (noting that in the early 
1980’s, the video game programmers at Mattel “weren't allowed to put their names 
on games because Mattel feared that would attract headhunters scouting for other 
game developers”). 
96 Jack G. Ganssle, Comments on Comments, EMBEDDED SYSTEMS PROGRAMMING, 
Mar. 1, 2002, at 73. 
97 Evan I. Schwartz, Sparking the Fire of Invention, TECHNOLOGY REV., May 2004, 
at 32.  See also Shane Schick, Tough Times Put Innovation Under Scrutiny, 
COMPUTING CANADA, Mar. 28, 2003, at 1. Occasionally, programmers have been able 
to develop projects for their employers, on their own time, which they have sold to 
their employers.  See Steve Alexander, Arrested Development, COMPUTERWORLD, 
Aug. 25, 1997, at 92 (citing a programmer who moonlighted, at his employer’s 
request, to create a certain piece of software, for which he was paid about 10% of his 
annual salary and was promoted into management). 
98 Russell Kay, Easter Eggs, COMPUTERWORLD, Sept. 18, 2000.  “In the software 
world, many programs are released simply under a company brand, with no mention of 
the individuals who put in a lot of work on the product. So you often see Easter Eggs 
listing the people who worked on the project as a sort of hidden "We made this!" 
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Open Source Software 
 
The open source software movement offers interesting examples of 
how credit is given in an environment dedicated to free dissemination of ideas.  
Open source software is software for which the source code is freely available 
to the public: “everybody has the right not only to use the software, but also to 
extend it, to adapt it to his or her own needs, and to redistribute the original or 
modified software to others.”99  Social norms govern “ownership” of open 
source code: owners are those recognized by the community to have the 
exclusive right to distribute modified versions.100 Attribution is important to 
many participants in the open source movement, even though exclusivity is 
shunned.  Code for open source projects is distributed with files listing the 
names of contributors.101  Different projects describe contributions in different 
levels of detail.102  According to open source norms, “Removing a person’s 
name from a project history, credits or maintainer list is absolutely not done 
                                                                                                                   
signature.” The Easter Egg Archive: Frequently Asked Questions, at 
http://www.eeggs.com/faq.html (last visited Aug. 3, 2005). See also David Pogue, 
The 1998 Eggy Awards, MACWORLD, May 1998, at 170 (“In recognition of their lack 
of recognition, programmers have learned to take matters into their own hands. . . . In 
the lingo of programmers, they create Easter eggs.  Now, because most software 
companies frown on such frivolous expenditures of talent, programmers must hide 
their Easter eggs (which is why they’re called Easter eggs)”). 
Sometimes even those who write malicious code want credit for it.  In 1992, a 
group of self-proclaimed “virus authors” called Phalcon/Skism told a reporter at 
Computerworld that they wrote viruses and post them to web boards in order to 
impress the other members of the board. Although they hid their real names, they often 
put their code names and the name of their group into the viruses they released. 
Michael Alexander, Challenge, Notoriety Cited as Impetus for Virus Developers, 
COMPUTERWORLD, Feb. 10, 1992, at 1, 8. 
99 Klaus M. Schmidt & Monika Schnitzer, Public Subsidies for Open Source?  Some 
Economic Policy Issues of the Software Market, 16 HARV. J. LAW & TEC. 473, 475 
(2003).  See also The Open Source Definition, version 1.9 at 
http://opensource.org/docs/def_print.php (last visited June 13, 2005). 
100 Eric S. Raymond, Homesteading the Noosphere, FIRST MONDAY, Oct. 5, 1998, at 
www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue3_10/raymond. 
101 See Matthias Stürmer, Open Source Community Building, Mar. 2, 2005 at 17-18 
at http://opensource.mit.edu/papers/sturmer.pdf at 124-146 (reporting interviews with 
open source participants).  The files are not necessarily kept up to date.  When asked 
about the credit system, Guido Wesdorp of open source browser editor Kupu said, 
“Yes, we have a credits text file in the package.  I don’t think it mentions all the 
developers.  Maybe I should correct that.”  Id. at 128. 
102 See Stürmer, supra note 101 at 146. 
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without the person’s explicit consent.”103  Open source projects may also 
acknowledge contributors by featuring them on the project’s website.104  There 
is some evidence to suggest that some programmers participate in the open 
source movement at least partly out of a desire to build their reputation.105  One 
open source programmer explained the credits file has a “business value” to 
him as a self-employed person:  “This is my reference.”106  Others have 
acknowledged the value of a reputation in the “gift culture” of open source, 
where “social status is determined not by what you control but by what you 
give away.”107  Although programmers often deny seeking reputation, the taboo 
against removing someone’s name from a program is considered by some to be 
                                                 
103 Raymond, supra note 100 (emphasis in original).  The credits files that are 
distributed with open source licenses vary in terms of filename and format.  Sometimes 
the most significant contributors are listed in an “Authors” file, while others appear in a 
separate file called “Thanks.” See also Stürmer, supra note 101, at 124 (quoting an 
interview with Bertrand Delacrétaz, who explains that minor contributions to the 
Apache Software Foundation’s Cocoon are included in the status file as they are 
incorporated into the code, but larger contributions are listed in the credits file).  
Sometimes the files list specific contributions, and sometimes they do not, but a file 
called “Changelog” lists exactly what was done at each update of the code.  It is 
common for the project to include a general note of thanks to everyone who 
contributed suggestions.  In addition to its Authors file, GNU Backgammon includes a 
screen within the application to show the credits list for those who want to look it up.   
104 See Stürmer, supra note 101, at 146 (interview with Gregor Rothfuss); Schmidt & 
Schnitzer, supra note 99, at 483. 
105 Schmidt & Schnitzer, supra note 99, at 482, observe that a “programmer who 
solved a difficult problem or contributed an important new piece of software signals 
her outstanding abilities to the outside world.  She is recognized by her peers, may 
get better future job offers, may be invited to participate in commercial open-source 
projects, or may have better access to the venture capital market if she wants to start 
her own business.” They worry that the desire for reputation gives open source 
programmers an incentive to produce works only for “sophisticated users who can 
evaluate the difficulty of the task and the importance of the contribution,” but not for 
the general population of consumers.  On the range of motives for participating in the 
Opens Source Movement, see Lerner & Tirole, supra note 95 at 218; Karim Lakhani 
& Robert G. Wolf, Why Hackers Do What They Do: Understanding Motivation and 
Effort in Free/Open Source Software Projects, Sept. 2003, at 
http://opensource.mit.edu/papers/lakhaniwolf.pdf;  PERSPECTIVES ON FREE AND OPEN 
SOURCE SOFTWARE (MIT Press 2005); Cristina Rossi & Andrea Bonaccorsi, 
Intrinsic Motivations and Profit-Oriented Firms in Open Source Software. Do Firms 
Practise What They Preach?, Feb. 2005, at 
http://opensource.mit.edu/papers/rossi_motivations.pdf. 
106 Stürmer, supra note 101 at 124. 
107 See also Schmidt & Schnitzer, supra note 99, at 481; Lakhani & Wolf, supra note 
105 at 5-6. 
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explainable only by the desire for reputation, even if it is not accompanied by 
monetary rewards.  Apart from reputation, there is the universal acceptance of 
the significance of credit as acknowledgement; one software developer said: 
“As a contributor you feel like my contribution is appreciated.”108   
 
 One of the most common challenges facing an attribution scheme is 
how to allocate credit and blame proportionately to the contribution to 
counteract the normal tendency of people to claim credit broadly and blame 
narrowly.  Open source licenses are an example of an explicit effort to divorce 
credit from blame in attribution.  All open source licenses seek to prevent bad 
modifications of the software from being attributed to the original authors.109  
There are different restrictions on what kind of credit should be given to 
contributors and whether modified code must have source code attached and a 
license for further redistribution.  One common open source license, the GNU 
General Public License (GPL), requires that those who modify a GPL program 
must put a notice in the source files declaring that they changed the file in order 
that recipients of modified software “know that what they have is not the 
original, so that any problems introduced by others will not reflect on the 
original authors' reputations.110  The Berkeley Software Distribution (BSD) 
License, another common license used for free software,  originally required 
any advertising of software to contain the list of contributors to the software, 
but this became unwieldy as contributor lists grew large, and it was finally 
removed from the BSD license, although there are still software licenses 
including the advertising clause.  The BSD license contains a clause protecting 
the original authors and contributors from being associated with a modified 
file.111  The license used by the Apache Software Foundation (ASF), a non-
profit organization which provides hardware and other infrastructure for open 
source projects, requires anyone who modifies and redistributes the source 
code to say that she changed the files and to include the copyright notices of 
                                                 
108 Stürmer, supra note 101, at 142.  Cf. Lerner & Tirole, supra note 95 at 213-14 
(noting “ego gratification” as a motivator). 
109 http://www.opensource.org/licenses/index.php (last visited June 13, 2005).   
110 GNU General Public License, at 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/GNU_General_Public_License (last modified June 10, 
2005) [hereinafter GPL]. A distinctive feature of the GPL is its requirement that all 
programs based on a GPL-licensed program must themselves be distributed along with 
their source code for free, with no restrictions on further redistribution.  This ensures 
that a programmer’s employer cannot suppress an employee’s improvements to GPL 
software except by not redistributing it at all.  Id. § 2(a). 
111 BSD License, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/BSD_license  (last modified June 8, 
2005); The BSD License Problem at http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/bsd.html (last 
updated May 5, 2005). 
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the pre-existing software. 112  Disallowing names within the source files 
prevents “the creation of personal islands within the codebase,” discourages 
“the pattern where people try and touch as many files as possible to get their 
name in as many files as possible,” and directs all liability to the ASF rather 
than to individual contributors.113 
  
 Creative Commons, like the open source movement, is a nonprofit 
organization dedicated to free dissemination of copyrighted works.  Creative 
Commons attaches a notice to books and other materials that it distributes 
stating that while users are free “to copy, distribute, display, and perform the 
work,” they must “give the original author credit” by attribution.114  It used to 
allow contributors to the site to disclaim attribution, but since virtually every 
contributor wanted attribution, they changed their default license option to 
include attribution. 
 
The experience of organizations devoted to a robust public domain 
suggests that even those devoted to minimizing intellectual property rights still 
insist on attribution.  Attribution is valued such that contributors must 
specifically choose to alienate their right to it, and the various organizations 
have developed a variety of creative, administrable, but in some cases fairly 
complex credit systems.  The attribution regimes appear to be relatively 
transparent to those who work in software and information technology.  The 
                                                 
112 Apache License, Version 2.0, Jan. 2004, 
http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0.txt; How the ASF Works – The 
Apache Software Foundation, at http://www.apache.org/foundation/how-it-
works.html (last visited June 13, 2005). 
113 Stürmer, supra note 101, at 146 (interview with Gregor Rothfuss); Id. at 124 
(“We are very well protected.  If for example I made an error in my code and some 
user of my Apache Cocoon software has problems because of that he can’t sue me 
since it’s all managed by the foundation”) (quoting an interview with Bertrand 
Delacrétaz)). 
 There are other examples of the same phenomenon.  The widely-used 
Mozilla Public License requires anyone who modifies the code to include 
information about what they changed, when they changed it, and who wrote the 
original code.  Like the others, the MPL also contains explicit denials of warranty 
and liability.   Mozilla Public License version 1.1 § 7, 9, available at 
http://www.mozilla.org/MPL/MPL-1.1.html (last visited June 13, 2005); see also 
Open Source Initiative OSI – Licensing, at 
http://www.opensource.org/licenses/index.php (last visited June 13, 2005). 
114 See, e.g., Creative Commons Deed Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 2.0.  
See www.creativecommons.org.  A sample of the attribution deed is found in Eric 
von Hippel, Democratizing Innovation (MIT Press 2005), which is available at 
http://web.mit.edu/evhippel/www/democ.htm. 
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apparent lack of hierarchy within open source organizations suggests a 
reasonable degree of participation and equality in defining when and how 
credit will be given in open source as compared to for-profit software 
development firms.  The attribution systems both at traditional firms and within 
open source seem reasonably efficient.  There is no data on how disputes over 
credit are resolved, nor is it clear whether false claims of credit are made and 
what happens if they are. While this evidence does not suggest that rights of 
attribution can never be inalienable, or that the informal and norms-based 
regimes by which attributions are made need legal intervention, it does suggest 
that copyright licenses are an area where legal rights to attribution should exist. 
 
 Journalism 
 
Norms vary and have evolved in the field of print and broadcast 
journalism as to when attribution should be made. Generally, the trend in 
journalism, as with other business sectors, appears to be in the direction of 
giving credit to more contributors.  For example, Time Magazine did not give 
bylines until the 1970s, and then at first only to critics.115 The New York Times 
is the most prominent example.  Its practice of expanding attribution appears to 
be partly a change in the traditionally hierarchical culture in which only a very 
small number of writers had bylines and people could write for the paper for 
years without ever seeing a byline.  The change is partly a response to recent 
controversies about falsified stories and inaccurate attribution.  For all these 
reasons, the paper increasingly credits, both by a byline at the beginning of a 
story and through acknowledgement of contributing writers and researchers at 
the end, several people who contributed to a story in different degrees.116  One 
such controversy illustrates the possibility either that norms are evolving or that 
abuses are now coming to light.  Rick Bragg, a Pulitzer Prize winning reporter, 
was accused of using uncredited “stringers” to assist in the preparation of 
articles.  The stringers conducted research out in the field, interviewed sources, 
and write some text of the story.  According to reports, Bragg then would fly in 
to the location at the end, complete the story, and file it under his byline with 
the remote dateline.  Although Bragg argued that his use of stringers was 
                                                 
115 New York Times Suspension Exposes Issue Over Bylines, WALL ST.J., May 27, 
2003 at B1. 
116 Much Ado About Bylines, THE VILLAGE VOICE, Sept. 24, 2003 at 26; Matthew 
Rose, Douglas Blackmon & Brian Steinberg, New York Times Suspension Exposes 
Issue Over Bylines, WALL ST.J., May 27, 2003 at B1; Howard Kurtz, Bylines, 
Datelines and Fault Lines at the N.Y. Times, WASHINGTON POST, June 2, 2003 at C1 
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consistent with common practice and was known to his editors, he nevertheless 
resigned his position with the Times.117  
 
Newspaper writers, including at the prestigious New York Times, Wall 
Street Journal, and Washington Post, occasionally deploy deliberate 
nonattribution, known as a byline strike, as a way of publicly protesting 
objectionable workplace policies.  In a byline strike, reporters refuse to allow 
their bylines to be published, counting on the importance of their bylines to 
savvy newspaper readers to alert readers to their complaints about the way 
management handled employment contract negotiations.118  Although reporters 
have no contractual right to prevent attribution, in byline strikes the 
newspapers accede to their wishes “in the interest of avoiding unnecessary 
controversy.”119  The success of such tactics suggests that all parties are aware 
that individual attribution is an important aspect of a newspaper’s credibility. 
 
In broadcast journalism, the norms of attribution, particularly of 
contributing writers, are quite different.120  It is common not to credit writers or 
researchers, perhaps because it is thought to be more distracting to use scarce 
air time to recite the names of people who contributed to a story.121  Perhaps 
the issue of uncredited contributors has yet to achieve the status of scandal 
because people do not tend to assume that the person who reports a story on the 
air necessarily wrote the story in the way that readers think equate a byline 
with exclusive authorship. 
 
The most well-known example that maintains a norm of nonattribution 
is the weekly newsmagazine (which calls itself a newspaper), The Economist. 
It uses no bylines except, by tradition, on articles written by editors on the 
                                                 
117 Jacques Steinberg, Times Reporter Steps Down Amid Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, May 
29, 2003, at A20; New York Times Reporter Resigns Over Suspension,  NEWSDAY, 
May 29, 2003 at 1. 
118 Steve Ritea, The Protest that Knows No Name, AM. JOURNALISM REV. Mar. 2003; 
Reporters’ Bylines Are Withheld, WALL ST.J., June 16, 2004 at A2; Baltimore Sun 
Reporters Stage ‘Byline Strike’:  Union Members Protest Plan to Hire Replacements 
in Case of Full Walkout, WASHINGTON POST, June 17, 2003 at E4. 
119 Reporters’ Bylines Are Withheld, WALL ST.J., June 16, 2004 at A2. 
120 Howard Kurtz, TV Wary of Problems That Keep Popping Up in Print, WASH. 
POST, July 14, 2003, at C1. 
121 Occasionally, however, broadcast journalists do credit researchers.  A segment on 
All Things Considered on National Public Radio on January 23, 2006, which 
included a report read by Lourdes Garcia Navarro from Baghdad also included a 
statement read by the anchor afterward crediting two persons identified as Iraqi 
employees of NPR for their contributions to the story. 
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occasion of their departure from the position.  The names of editors and 
correspondents are found on the staff pages of the The Economist’s website, 
but the publication does not credit articles to individuals in order “to speak[] 
with a collective voice,” and to reflect that articles are often collaborative 
projects among multiple writers and editors, and, most importantly, to maintain 
the “belief that what is written is more important than who writes it.”122   
 
Regardless of the practices with respect to crediting researchers, 
writers, editors, or producers to the public, there are norms that govern the 
claiming of credit or responsibility for collaborative projects within the 
industry, and these norms influence how reputations are made both within an 
organization (who the paper will nominate for a Pulitzer Prize, who it will 
promote) and to others in the industry (who wins a Pulitzer or other prize; how 
a journalist moves from one job to the next).123  It is in this context that the 
inalienability of credit matters in the creation of human capital.  Anecdotal 
evidence suggests that many journalists have experienced perceived unfairness 
and have felt that there was little recourse for them.124 
 
There appears to be two fairly clear tiers with respect to journalist 
attributions and the six fairness and efficiency criteria.  Overall the system 
seems to operate quickly and cheaply, and thus seems fairly efficient, given the 
substantial importance both to individuals and to the organizations. Recognized 
journalists have good information and quite a bit of power about bylines and 
thus the norms with respect to them appear to rate high on the scale of 
transparency, equality, participation, due process, and substantive fairness.  
With respect to stringers and junior reporters, the situation seems quite 
different.  For example, The New York Times credits stringers or free lancers 
                                                 
122 www.economist.com.  Articles in surveys published in special supplements 
several times a year are also signed.  The paper quotes Geoffrey Crowther, The 
Economist’s editor from 1938 to 1956, as saying that anonymity keeps the editor 
“not the master but the servant of something far greater than himself.  You can call 
that ancestor-worship if you wish, but it gives the paper an astonishing momentum of 
thought and principle.”  Id. It may also be that the paper relies on a worldwide 
network of stringers, as well as a staff of about 20 correspondents abroad, and thus 
wishes seamlessly to blend the work of its editors and correspondents with the on-
the-ground research of stringers. 
123 On the importance of the Pulitzer Prize in creating reputation, see J. DOUGLAS 
BATES, THE PULITZER PRIZE:  THE INSIDE STORY OF AMERICA’S MOST PRESTIGIOUS 
AWARD (1991) (“In newspaper journalism, the prize works a form of magic that 
defies logic or easy explanation.  No other newspaper award – and there are at least 
three hundred – comes close to the high stakes of the Pulitzer”). 
124 See infra III.A. 
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only in rare cases where “their pieces reflect unusual enterprise or unusual 
writing style,” which appears to be a discretionary determination of editors 
over which employees have little influence.125   
 
4. Politics and Government 
 
 The norms of attribution within the vast bureaucracies of government 
are fascinating and have been much in the news lately as Americans have tried 
to figure out whether to attribute memos written by young Justice Department 
lawyers to them later in their careers as they have been nominated for positions 
on the Supreme Court, or whom to hold accountable for memos advocating the 
legality of torture.  Anyone who has worked for a government knows the 
multiple functions of author identification.  The memos are almost always 
written to advise someone in a decisionmaking capacity about what the 
government’s official position or course of action should be; they usually do 
not represent the views of the decisionmaker until approved.  The actual 
author(s) is/are identified so that the higher-ups know to whom to direct 
questions, which people are behind the work (which may say something about 
credibility), which department an initiative is coming from, and often who has 
reviewed and approved the contents.  But government employees know that 
memos are sometimes used to assess the analytic or research abilities of the 
employees who wrote them, and authorship of an important memo can be a 
status marker. 
 
Speech writers   
 
Speech writers present an interesting example where there is obviously 
a norm of non-attribution.  This is an area where we’re prepared to allow 
people to contract for anonymity, or, rather, for the transferability of attribution.  
We attribute a politician’s speeches to the politician, not to the speech writer.  
The alienability of attribution allows speech writers to earn a living and 
politicians to spend less time crafting speeches and more time on other tasks.  
Moreover, politicians can articulate more finely nuanced positions, and do so 
more eloquently, than if they had to write their own speeches.  Of course, they 
could still do all that even if they had to give credit to speech writers.  One 
might argue that in a regime in which voters, commentators, and the press treat 
speeches as evidence not merely of the policy agenda of the administration but 
also of the personality of the person, transferability of attribution may 
encourage an undesirable laziness in the way we think about politics and 
                                                 
125 Matthew Rose, Douglas Blackmon & Brian Steinberg, New York Times 
Suspension Exposes Issue Over Bylines, WALL ST.J., May 27, 2003 at B1. 
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personality.  We get away with it only by forgetting that the politician who 
gives a speech, especially when the politician has a large staff of advisers, 
speech writers, issues advisors, etc., is more of a spokesperson for group than 
an individual whose personal qualities (whether of intelligence, folksiness, 
judgment, or personal rectitude with respect to matters financial or sexual), 
somehow makes him or her more or less fit to govern.  In other words, the 
complex of norms and contracts that enables the complete transferability of 
attribution in speech writing may facilitate a cult of the personality in politics 
that we would be better off without.  
 
In contrast to Hollywood, where a norm of attribution humanizes a 
product by reminding the viewing public that real people are behind the 
massive fantasy of movies, the norm of non-attribution is what seems to the 
voting public to humanize politicians.  A really good speech or turn of phrase 
(“Ask not what your country can do for you”; “The only thing we have to fear 
is fear itself”; “Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall”) can become an emblem of 
the person, not merely the policy proposal of the administration.126  Yet the 
relationship between attribution and the humanity of the participants in a 
collaborative process is complex.  A recent memoir by a ghost writer who 
made a respectable income for several years ghost writing not merely official 
writings and speeches but also love letters and personal correspondence, 
suggests that the ghost writing experience had some degrading qualities both 
                                                 
126 Although conventional wisdom for a time credited Kennedy speech writer Ted 
Sorenson with the “Ask not” speech, a recent book asserts that Kennedy deserves 
substantial credit for it.  THURSTON CLARKE, ASK NOT:  THE INAUGURATION OF JOHN 
F. KENNEDY AND THE SPEECH THAT CHANGED AMERICA (2006).  The “Tear Down 
This Wall” speech was given by President Reagan at the Brandenberg Gate of the 
Berlin Wall on June 12, 1987.  See 
http://www.reaganfoundation.org/reagan/speeches/wall.asp (last visited Feb. 22, 
2006).  Credit for that speech has been taken by many, including Peter Robinson, 
who passes on the credit for “the key phrase” to “a woman I met at a dinner party,” 
and to Ronald Reagan who is the person responsible for keeping the phrase in the 
speech.  See Peter Robinson, Tearing Down That Wall, HOOVER DIGEST (1997), 
available at http://www.hooverdigest.org/974/robinson.html (last visited Feb. 22, 
2006).  FDR’s famous first inaugural, in contrast to inaugural speeches since 
Lincoln’s brilliant second inaugural, “show[ed] the advantages of full-scale 
ghostwriting -- although he encouraged the myth that he wrote his famous first 
inaugural address in one vigorous night of work at Hyde Park. According to 
biographer Kenneth Davis, Roosevelt hand-copied a draft by speechwriter Raymond 
Moley, apparently so it would look like his own work.”  David Von Drehl, History 
Will Judge the Message and Its Messenger:  Not All Oratory By Presidents Created 
Equal, WASHINGTON POST, Jan. 30, 2005 at A36. 
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for herself and for the person for whom she wrote.127  A ghost, after all, is 
usually portrayed as a hollowed out human being who is not really alive.  In the 
case of the ghost writer, the memoir makes clear that both the writer and the 
person who hired her were ghosting. 
 
Judicial Opinions   
 
Judges traditionally receive substantial and largely uncredited 
assistance from law clerks in drafting opinions, even if judges decide for 
themselves how the case should come out.  There are good reasons (apart from 
tradition) for the norm of non-attribution.  The authority of judges might be 
doubted if it were commonly recognized that recent law school graduates do 
much of the work of providing reasons.  It is difficult to separate the idea from 
its execution, and thus hard to attribute responsibility for the decision on each 
point, the original articulation of rationale, the evolving reasoning through 
multiple revisions, and the final wording.  It is both psychologically and 
politically desirable to encourage law clerks to elide their role in persuading the 
judge, for if clerks could publicize their disagreement with their judge, judges 
might either be less candid with their clerks or would have to defend their 
reasons other than just in the written opinion.  Most lawyers and judges regard 
both the role of the law clerk in drafting and the norm of non-attribution as 
unproblematic in most cases, although some judges have remarked publicly 
that judges should eschew clerk drafting of opinions.  And even those judges 
who find it unproblematic to have clerks draft substantial portions of opinions, 
or at least early drafts of opinions, would likely be troubled if a judge delegated 
the entirety of the opinion-writing task in every case to clerks.128   
 
There is an interesting norm of attribution regarding clerks’ work.  
While it is entirely acceptable to note which judge one clerked for during 
which term, many consider it poor form for a former clerk to say anything 
about one’s work beyond “My judge had before her the case of So and So v. 
Such and Such, or maybe, I worked with my judge on So and So v. Such and 
Such.  Yet hiring decisions for people who clerked are explicitly made on the 
assumption that during the clerkship the law clerk received valuable training 
about legal analysis and learned how that judge, and perhaps others on the 
same court, approaches cases, and that the former clerk will, in the new job, 
impart that knowledge to his or her law practice colleagues or students. 
 
                                                 
127 See generally ERDAL, supra note 45. 
128 Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Which Judges Write Their Opinions (and 
Should We Care)?, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=715062. 
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(Non)Attribution norms in politics and government are perhaps the 
most troubling to assess in terms of the fairness and efficiency criteria because 
we recognize both the desirability that government speak with an official voice, 
rather than the voices of many individuals, and the desirability that government 
be accountable.  Here, too, there is a tension between the view that government 
requires a heightened sense of confidentiality and secrecy to protect the candor 
and efficacy of deliberations of government from undue influence and outside 
threat and the countervailing view that in a democracy transparency and 
accountability are essential. 
 
5. Professional Certification 
 
In contrast to the worlds of business and academia, where attribution is 
governed only by norms or by contract (as in the case of Hollywood), the 
professions have legally mandated requirements of attribution as well as 
norms.  The legal requirements of attribution are almost uniformly designed to 
enforce the disciplinary function of attribution, the norms of attribution operate 
pretty much as they do in other sectors, as rewards and as brands.  Because the 
legal requirements of attribution are distinct, it is to those that I devote the most 
attention here. 
 
All U.S. states have statutes for professional registration of building 
design professionals such as architects and engineers.129  The basic principle in 
most states is that each architect and engineer who is licensed to design 
buildings and structures has a seal which law requires that he or she affix to 
plans, drawings, specifications or other formal design documents to certify that 
architect or engineer personally prepared or reviewed it.  For example, in 
Indiana the engineer’s seal “attests that: (1) The work embodies the 
engineering work of the registrant; (2) the registrant or an employed 
subordinate supervised by the registrant prepared the documents . . . (3) The 
registrant assumes full professional responsibility for the documents; and (4) 
The work meets standards of acceptable engineering practice.”130  Licensing 
boards in many states are empowered to take action against an architect who 
uses his or her seal or allows it to be used on documents that the architect has 
                                                 
129 STEVEN G. M. STEIN, 1-1 CONSTRUCTION LAW § 1.01[a], Release 54, June 2005. 
130 Indiana Statutes § 25-31-1-16.  See also 22 Texas Administrative Code § 137.33 
(“(a) The purpose of the engineer's seal is to assure the user . . . that the work has 
been performed or directly supervised by the professional engineer named and to 
delineate the scope of the engineer's work.  (b) License holders shall only seal work 
done by them, performed under their direct supervision . . . . Upon sealing, engineers 
take full professional responsibility for that work.”) 
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not personally prepared or supervised the preparation of.131  Engineers and 
architects have been disciplined by licensing boards for allowing their seal or 
signature to be used for plans they did not create and for which they did not 
supervise the drawing.  Though rarely imposed, criminal sanctions for misuse 
of a seal also exist in many states.132 
 
The responsibility of engineers for defects in buildings has at times 
been a subject of some controversy within the professional engineering circles.  
A particularly revealing example arose from the collapse of a suspended 
walkway in a Hyatt Hotel in Kansas City, Missouri, in which 114 people were 
killed and nearly 200 were injured.  The incident raised questions about 
whether accepting responsibility for the defects was a price to be paid by the 
engineers.133    
 
The cause of the collapse may have been that in the rush to complete 
the hotel building on a fast track, the engineers left unspecified (that is, for the 
fabricators to work out) a detail about how suspended walkways were to be 
connected to the supporting rods.  The engineers’ sketch suggested a single set 
of rods should connect the walkways to the ceiling but on the construction site 
it became apparent that such a design was unworkable so two sets of rods were 
used.  During construction, engineer Daniel Duncan was asked about the 
design change six times, and each time said that the change was safe.  Jack 
Gillum, the head of Duncan’s firm, placed his seal on the documents as the 
engineer of record. 
 
After the walkway collapsed, no criminal charges were filed against 
the engineers, and insurance companies settled the civil suits.  The Missouri 
licensing board did, however, revoke the two engineers’ licenses.  The 
licensing board rejected the defense that the project was too complex for the 
engineers to have personally checked every detail and found Duncan guilty of 
gross negligence because he made assurances about the safety of the design 
without actually checking it.134  Gillum was found responsible as well, based 
                                                 
131 Wyoming Statutes § 33-4-115. Pennsylvania’s licensing board can take action 
against “[a]n architect who impresses his seal or knowingly permits it to be 
impressed on drawings, specifications or other design documents which were not 
prepared by him or under his personal supervision.”  63 P.S. § 34.12. 
132 STEIN, supra note 129 at § 1.01[c] & n.65. 
133 This account of the incident is drawn from Sarah K. A. Pfatteicher,“The Hyatt 
Horror”: Failure and Responsibility in American Engineering, 14 J. PERFORMANCE 
CONSTRUCTED FACILITIES 63 (2000), and from Duncan v. Missouri Board of 
Architects, Professional Engineers and Land Surveyors, 744 S.W.2d 524 (1988). 
134 744 S.W.2d at 541. 
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on the licensing law that held a professional engineer “responsible for the 
contents of all” documents he sealed.135  The Court of Appeals of Missouri, in 
affirming the licensing board’s decision to revoke both engineers’ licenses, 
explained that “the whole thrust of” the law requiring engineers to put their 
seal on plans “is to place individual personal and professional liability upon a 
known and certificated engineer.”  In the court’s view, the statute authorized 
discipline of “the engineer responsible for the project whether the improper 
conduct is that of himself or attributable to the employees or others upon whom 
he relies.”136  Other state licensing boards also revoked Gillum’s and Duncan’s 
licenses.137  The American Society of Civil Engineers’ Committee on 
Professional Conduct found Gillum “vicariously responsible . . . but not guilty 
of gross negligence nor of unprofessional conduct” and suspended him for 
three years.138  Duncan was not a member of the ASCE, so his liability was not 
addressed by that organization. 
 
There are multiple reasons and many norms governing when a 
professional will put her name on a case.  Lawyers want their names on 
pleadings to make a reputation and as a measure of their hard work and to have 
some control over the course of litigation.  Judges use the names on briefs as a 
measure of the importance the case and the reliability of the arguments made, 
and other lawyers use the names on pleadings, like doctors use signatures on 
medical records, as a way to know whom to contact in case of questions.    But 
where law requires the naming of the professional, it is usually for purposes of 
accountability for poor work.  Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which requires lawyers to sign all court filings in order to hold accountable 
those who sign frivolous filings, is another form of professional certification 
designed to attribute poor work for the purposes of deterrence and 
punishment.139  The legislatures that enacted the engineer and architect’s seal 
                                                 
135 Missouri Revised Statutes § 327.411. 
136 744 S.W.2d at 538. 
137 Pfatteicher, supra note 133 at 65.  Duncan never worked again as an engineer.  
Gillum, however, became president of a southern California engineering firm in 
1992, and California restored his license in 1994. 
138 Id. at 65 (quoting ASCE-Committee on Professional Conduct, Disciplinary 
Proceedings: Case of Mr. Jack Gillum, M. ASCE, Docket No. 1982-6 (1986)). 
139 Rule 11 provides, in pertinent part, that “[e]very pleading, written motion, and 
other paper shall be signed by at least one attorney of record” and that “[b]y 
presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) a 
pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney … is certifying that … it is not 
being presented for any improper purpose …, the claims, defenses, and other legal 
contentions therein are warranted by existing law …, [and] the allegations and other 
factual contentions have evidentiary support ....”  FED. R. CIV. P. 11. 
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regulations and the Advisory Committee that adopted Rule 11 deemed neither 
the norms of professional competence and zeal nor the reputation costs of 
ineptitude, nor even possible malpractice liability sufficient to counteract the 
incentives for misfeasance.   
 
Greater transparency, equality, and due process were thought necessary 
when putting a name on a case would be the basis for punishment, and thus it 
was in these cases where legislatures decided that the norms-based systems of 
attribution were inadequate.  With the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 
the wake of the Enron scandal, we see a similar instinct:  greater individual 
accountability is necessary in some work environments where wrongdoing can 
be too easily buried in collective responsibility.140  Given the serious 
punishments that violations of these statutory attribution systems can visit, 
transparency and due process are valued highly.  In all of these areas, 
legislatures imposed a requirement of individual attribution with greater 
attention to transparency, equality, and due process than previously exhibited 
by the norms-based systems.  They did so for the purpose of disciplining 
offenders. 
 
*  *  * 
 
One of the most intriguing things about the attribution regimes 
described above is the variety and nuance that exists for making attributions.  
Norms perform credit, blame, branding, and humanizing functions for a welter 
of collaborative projects.  In a few areas (such as professional responsibility) 
norms are supplemented but not supplanted by laws, and when they are the 
requirements of equality and transparency are taken very seriously.  Across 
fields over the last generation there has been a tendency to expand the number 
of people and the types of contributions that are attributed.  Credits have grown 
longer and more elaborate in the movies and in advertising and graphic design; 
more researchers are acknowledged in print journalism and in science.  The 
expansion of attribution may be because the financial rewards for attribution 
have increased, and it may be in part because workplace hierarchies are less 
stable in a post-60’s culture than they used to be.  As attribution has grown 
more prevalent, norms have adjusted to explain, with the appropriate nuance, 
where and to what degree blame will be allocated when a project fails. 
 
 
                                                 
140 Sarbanes Oxley Act, Pub. L. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002); JOHN T. 
BOSTELMAN, THE SARBANES-OXLEY DESKBOOK (2003). 
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III. When and Why Attribution Regimes Fail 
 
 
Most existing attribution schemes have significant flaws, and the flaws 
matter.  In this section, I attempt to generalize about when false attributions are 
problematic and to suggest that the failures of existing norms-based or 
contract-based attribution systems are neither isolated nor inconsequential.  In 
the first part, I describe, from the perspectives of employees, employers, and 
third parties, why attribution problems exist and attempt to generalize about 
what causes the problems.  In the second part, I theorize about why the 
problems are examples of market failure and consider other arguments for legal 
regulation. 
 
A. Why Attribution Failures Occur and Why Failures Matter 
 
From the perspective of employees who contribute to group projects, 
attribution problems occur in a number of circumstances for several reasons 
but they can all be boiled down to two.  First, the most common complaint is 
that attribution is wrongly made between people of dramatically unequal social 
or economic power.  The abuses of power are difficult to check in the privacy 
of interpersonal work relationships when others cannot monitor who did what 
on a project.  The supervisor often has the power to make or break a young 
person’s career through promotion, firing or giving a positive or negative 
review; the young worker often does not have the power to challenge her. 
Graduate students often feel themselves too dependent on the good will of the 
senior professor to challenge his or her claim of credit for work that should 
properly be attributed to the student.  Particularly in the case of graduate 
students or junior faculty, it is simply not an option to go work elsewhere when 
a false claim of credit is made.  The norms of the work relationships may frown 
on job changes, and the labor market for graduate students or junior faculty 
often make a job switch impossible after only a short period of employment.141 
 
A second and related complaint about attribution is arbitrariness.  
Among the circumstances in which it is possible that attribution will be 
wrongly made, employees have difficulty knowing in advance how attribution 
will be done. Two journalists whom I interviewed for this project told a similar 
story of when they were young reporters free-lancing for newspapers in 
different cities.  Each researched and wrote newspaper stories that wound up 
getting a fair amount of attention in the newspaper.  One journalist said that the 
                                                 
141 Sandip H. Patel, Note, Graduate Students’ Ownership and Attribution Rights in 
Intellectual Property, 71 IND. L.J. 481 (1996). 
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editor who assigned her the project said that the story was too important to be 
published under the byline of a free-lance writer whom no one had ever heard 
of, so he put his byline on it instead.  The journalist said she felt there was no 
one in the newsroom to whom she could complain about the incident because 
either people would not believe her, or higher-ups would agree that the 
credibility the story (and hence the newspaper) would gain from being 
published under an established byline was more important than her career.  She 
also feared alienating the writer/editor on whom she depended for more 
assignments and for her hope of career advancement within the paper.  The 
other journalist said that he was in a similar situation except that the senior 
writer who assigned the project said:  “you need this byline to make your 
reputation, and I don’t.  Let’s put your name on it.”  The disparity in treatment 
of the two journalists illustrates the problem of arbitrariness in who is credited 
and who is not, depending on the good will, whim, or conscience of senior 
workers. 
 
One might say that the market will correct for both the abuse of power 
and the arbitrariness of attribution.  That is, powerful people who 
opportunistically but inaccurately claim credit will get a bad reputation and 
have difficulty attracting talented young collaborators.  The problem is that it is 
often difficult for junior people to know which people to avoid and, once they 
have stumbled into a relationship where inaccurate claims are made, to correct 
the record.  An example from Hollywood illustrates the difficulty of correcting 
the record.  The WGA arbitration process determined that Susannah Grant 
wrote the script for Erin Brockovich, and that the contributions of the rewrite 
by Richard LaGravenese were simply mild restructuring and some new 
dialogue which did not amount to a fifty-percent revision necessary for screen 
credit.  Nevertheless, Julia Roberts (whose every word is widely reported in the 
press) said when she received an Oscar and in many other contexts that 
LaGravenese had written or co-authored the script.  This prompted Grant to 
lament:  “It’s incredibly painful and galling for people to say that the best work 
you ever did was written by somebody else. . . . [O]ther than carrying scripts 
around in my handbag and saying to every person I meet, ‘Here are the three 
drafts I wrote, and I’d like you to spend seven hours reading them,’ there’s 
nothing I can do.”  Of course, Grant did get the sole screen credit and was 
nominated for an Oscar, so she fared much better than most whose work is not 
correctly attributed.  But even she claims her reputation suffered.   One of the 
reasons that workers in Hollywood like the public aspect of screen credit is that 
it creates certainty – once you’re listed on screen, it is difficult (though not 
impossible as the Susannah Grant episode illustrates) for credit to be taken 
away on a whim. 
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One final note about these employee concerns about attribution: the 
harm may be more than just hurt feelings or lost earnings, although those can 
be nontrivial.  Employees aware of the risk of misattribution, especially if they 
believe it cannot be prevented or remedied, experience anxiety.  Moreover, the 
fear of an inaccurate reference can prompt people to avoid making desirable 
job switches.  Misattribution is a particularly severe restriction on labor market 
mobility, and in today’s economy that mobility is particularly valued as an 
engine of economic growth.   An emerging literature suggests that today’s 
employees face greater risks than at any time in the last half century, and they 
know it.142  Periods of unemployment last, on average, fifty percent longer now 
than in the 1970s, and a smaller percentage of unemployed people receive 
unemployment insurance now as compared to the 1940s.  Employees are being 
asked to be entrepreneurial in many aspects of their lives, including in being 
willing to switch jobs, retrain, and fund their own health care and retirement 
through investment savings accounts, so they need to believe that they will 
have the ability to compete in the labor market.  Of course, anxiety about 
attribution is only a small part of what makes the modern labor market risky.  
Nevertheless, employees are more motivated when they believe they will get 
credit for good work and not be falsely blamed for bad work.  In this respect, 
accurate attribution is to employee effort as the stability of legal regimes or 
security of property rights are to investment:  all are important to encouraging 
effort and entrepreneurship. 
 
From the perspective of employers, false attributions present different 
problems.  Prospective employees have incentives to lie on their resumes about 
all kinds of things:  whether or where they got academic degrees, the nature 
and extent of prior work experience, and why they left past jobs.  Employers 
complain that while some resume fraud can be detected with some time or 
expense (you can confirm whether someone graduated from a university, 
though often not what their grades were), it is difficult to detect deception 
about past work experience because prior employers often decline to give 
detailed job references describing what the employee did and why they left. 
Trademark law exists because of the possibility of passing off one type of good 
as something else.  But there is no trademark law that applies to employees.  
Many firms decline to give job references (perhaps fearing defamation suits for 
negative references), and even when references are given there is no guarantee 
of reliability, as no jurisdiction provides for liability for a falsely positive 
reference absent intentional fraud likely to cause serious harm.  There is in 
                                                 
142 Recent literature on employees and increased risk is clearly and briefly 
summarized for a lay audience by James Surowiecki in Lifers, THE NEW YORKER, 
January 16, 2006, at 29.  See also JACOB HACKER, GREAT RISK SHIFT (2006). 
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most jurisdictions no cause of action against a former employer for 
misrepresenting or failing to disclose the known defects of a former employee 
and no cause of action against an employee for lying on a resume.143 
 
Employers also experience attribution problems with respect to 
evaluating current employees.  Supervisors can take credit from or pass blame 
to subordinates without easy detection from upper management.  The difficulty 
with attribution is not merely a problem of bad faith but one of institutional 
design.  Participants in some group projects often do not know exactly what 
their contributions are.  Ex ante, they don’t know what the project will entail, 
how long it will take, who will contribute how much in terms of time, useful 
ideas or skills along the way, or even whether the project will succeed enough 
to make it worth thinking about who did what.  Ex post, people have a hard 
time reconstructing what their contribution was, and psychological literature 
shows a tendency of people to exaggerate (in their own mind) their successful 
interventions and to forget their failures. Some of the literature even suggests 
that it is entirely rational for participants to exhibit this form of overconfidence 
in their abilities and skill.144  The ex post problem thus will matter both when a 
project succeeds past the creators’ expectations and fails in unanticipated ways.  
When the project succeeds, collaborators will come out of the woodwork to 
claim credit, and when it fails, collaborators will disappear just as quickly to 
                                                 
143 John Ashby, Note, Employment References:  Should Employers Have an 
Affirmative Duty to Report Employee Misconduct to Inquiring Prospective 
Employers? 46 ARIZ. L. REV. 117 (2004); Susan Oliver, Opening the Channels of 
Communication Among Employers:  Can Employers Discard Their “No Comment” 
and Neutral Job Reference Policies? 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 687 (1999). One of the very 
few cases suggesting liability for a falsely positive reference, Randi W v. Muroc 
Unified School Dist., 929 P.2d 582 (Cal. 1997), limited the claim to circumstances in 
which the former employer knew of and intentionally failed to disclose the 
employee’s propensity to cause serious bodily harm while affirmatively 
recommending the employee for employment.    
144 See, e.g., Eric Van den Steen, Skill or Luck?  Biases of Rational Agents MIT 
Sloan School Working Paper 4255-02 (June 2002), and sources cited therein; Brice 
Corgnet, Team Formation and Biased Self-Attribution Working Paper available on 
SSRN (October 2005); D.T. Miller & M. Ross, Self-Serving Biases in the Attribution 
of Causality:  Fact or Fiction? 82 PSYCH. BULL. 213 (1975); G.W. Bradley, Self-
Serving Biases in the Attribution Process:  A Reexamination of the Fact or Fiction 
Question, 35 J. PERS. & SOC. PSYCH. 56 (1978); M. Zuckerman, Attribution and of 
Success and Failure Revisited or, The Motivational Bias is Alive and Well in 
Attribution Theory 47 J. PERSONALITY 245 91979); J.D. Brown, Evaluations of Self 
and Others:  Self-Enhancement Biases in Social Judgments, 4 SOCIAL COGNITION 
353 (1986); S. Gervais & I. Goldstein, The Effects of Biased Self-Perception in 
Teams [Fuqua Working Paper 2004]. 
CREDIT WHERE IT’S DUE                                                                     57 
avoid blame.145  Objective measures of accomplishment can sometimes be 
verified, but subjective measures are notoriously difficult without direct 
observation, and even with direct observation it is often difficult to assess the 
use of tacit knowledge.146 Employers thus face significant obstacles to getting 
accurate information about employees. 
 
Third parties also have interests in accurate attribution and are harmed 
when false claims are made.  A plumbing contractor who hires an inept 
plumber hurts not only his reputation but his clients.  Attribution issues in 
science undermine the integrity of research.  In theory, scientists share credit 
with collaborators, cite data from competing labs, acknowledge contributions 
from students, and make their work available to others.  In practice, scientists 
often feel pressure to claim individual credit that may not be individually 
deserved in order to secure access to grant funding, to gain promotion or 
tenure, to secure prestigious publications that will aid in the wide dissemination 
of their research, or to recruit high-quality graduate and post-doctoral students 
for the laboratory.147   
 
B. Why Legal Regulation of Attribution is Desirable 
                                                 
145 Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Collaborative Research:  Conflicts on Authorship, 
Ownership, and Accountability, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1162 (2000), notes many of these 
problems.  One of the most well-known cases addressing the ex post problem of 
reconstructing the degree of contributions to a work after the fact was the dispute 
over authorship of the Broadway musical, Rent.  The dramaturg who had 
collaborated with the playwright sued to establish her status as a joint author after the 
playwright died unexpectedly just after the last dress rehearsal and the playwright’s 
family denied that she had been a joint author.  Thomson v. Larson, 147 F.3d 195 (2d 
Cir. 1998).  The dramaturg later explained:  “I am often asked why I had no contract.  
The short answer is that I didn’t know Jonathan Larson was going to die  I trusted his 
decency and I still do.  We discussed our relationship and his obligations and beyond 
that I made no efforts to draw attention to my contributions.”  Quoted in Roberta 
Rosenthall Kwall, “Author-Stories”:  Narrative’s Implications for Moral Rights and 
Copyright’s Joint Authorship Doctrine, 75 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 54 (2001).  See also     
Aalmuhammed v. Lee, 202 F.3d 1227, 1235 (9th Cir. 2000) (joint authorship should 
err on the side of limiting the number of people who qualify as joint authors, lest 
“research assistants, editors, and former spouses, lovers and friends” appear suddenly 
to claim a share of the credit and profits for a successful work). 
146 See sources cited supra note 9. 
147 Jon Cohen & Gary Taubes, The Culture of Credit:  Scientific Ideals Call for 
Collaboration and Sharing, 268 SCIENCE 1706 (1995); Katherine W. McCain, 
Communication, Competition, and Secrecy:  The Production and Dissemination of 
Research-Related Information in Genetics, 16 SCI. TECH. & HUMAN VALUES 491 
(1991). 
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The nature of a resource should define the rights to it.  The commodity 
value of credit is informational.  Credit loses its value, at least to some 
consumers and to the producer, if it is transferred because accurate information 
is lost.  An argument might be made that the right to attribution must be 
nontransferable in any circumstance in which the value of accurate attribution 
is greater than the value of misattribution.  I do not argue that all forms of 
attribution must be inalienable:  there should remain a role for informal 
collaboration, speech writers, anonymous authors, and uncredited research 
assistants, muses, and amanuenses.  I also recognize that in many cases it is 
difficult or impossible to define in advance of creation how credit will be 
allocated, and once creation has occurred it is equally difficult to reconstruct 
retrospectively who did what.  Nevertheless, as we know from the variety of 
attribution schemes that exist, it is both possible and desirable to achieve some 
degree of certainty about who did what.  When norms-based regimes fail, law 
is a desirable supplement. 
 
As has been shown, credit is valuable and, consequently, collaborators 
often are tempted opportunistically to claim credit where it is not due. The 
temptation cannot be fully controlled simply by voluntary agreement for 
reasons encapsulated in two ordinary examples.  (1) A supervisor promises to 
credit an employee for her work but later decides to fire her for resisting his 
sexual overtures and states in a job reference that she never did any work.  The 
supervisor has two incentives to lie:  to enhance his own reputation for work 
and to cover up his sexual harassment and retaliation against a subordinate.  (2) 
A corporation pays annual bonuses based on productivity.  A supervisor or co-
worker claims a larger bonus for himself by taking credit for others’ work.  To 
the extent that credit is economically valuable and the accuracy of claims is 
difficult to substantiate, it is likely that false assertions will be made.  The more 
valuable and untestable the claims about human capital, the greater the risk of 
opportunism. 
 
The need for legal regulation exists because some credit ought to be 
inalienable, and yet the market fails reliably to produce information about who 
deserves credit and who should be rewarded in such cases.  Problems of 
information asymmetry plague the proper allocation of credit.  Outsiders to a 
workplace may not have access to information about who did work.  When an 
employee goes into the labor market to find a new job, the prospective 
employer may not be able to tell whether the accomplishments the employee 
claims on his or her resume are exaggerated.  The economic theory of the 
“lemon market” suggests that when there is an information asymmetry, as 
when only the seller knows whether a used car is a lemon, the market does not 
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function efficiently because buyers discount the price they are willing to pay to 
account for the possibility that the car is a lemon, but at the lower price sellers 
of good cars are unwilling to sell and so more lemons will be offered for sale, 
which scares off potential buyers even more.  The problem is that sellers of 
used cars know whether the car is good, but buyers do not, and if buyers cannot 
trust sellers, then fewer cars will be sold than there would be if buyers could 
figure out whether a car is a lemon.  The market for prospective employees is 
similar:  the worker has better information than the prospective employer about 
the worker’s capabilities, and the prospective employer cannot trust the 
prospective worker.148 
 
A mechanism to address the information problem is a signal that only 
the good sellers can afford to make.  For example, sellers of good cars can offer 
warranties, but sellers of lemons cannot afford to do so.  An enforceable 
warranty operates as a reliable signal of quality and thus facilitates efficient 
bargains.  Accurate attributions of credit could operate as a signal to enable 
prospective employers know whether a particular worker has the human capital 
necessary to do the job.  If credit attributions are not reliable, it is as if 
warranties on used cars are not reliably legally enforceable:  the signal does not 
fix the lemon market problem.  Without reliable signals of quality, prospective 
employers cannot distinguish between high-quality and low-quality employees 
and will hire fewer employees than they otherwise would. 
 
The question is how to make credit attributions more a reliable signal.  
Given the unwillingness of many employers to provide detailed references, the 
challenge is to come up with other reliable evidence of employee contributions 
to collaborative projects.  In theory the creator could produce drafts, laboratory 
notebooks, or other evidence to prove her work, but in practice it is often not 
possible to do so.  As Susannah Grant explained, you can’t always ask people 
to spend seven hours reading the multiple drafts of a collaborative project to 
figure out your contributions to it.  Moreover, the norms of hierarchy and 
confidentiality often prevent an employee from showing past work product.  
An employee who quits or is fired usually is prohibited by the former employer 
from removing any documents or computer files when she leaves and thus will 
                                                 
148 HAL. R. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 468-470(3d ed. 1992) (explaining 
the lemon market example); ANDREU MAS-COLELL, MICHAEL D. WHINSTON & 
JERRY R. GREEN, MICROECONOMIC THEORY 450-472(1995).  Both texts include 
labor market examples about the difficulty of assessing employee ability as an 
example of information asymmetry where the market develops various signaling and 
screening devices, principally education, to deal with the market failure that would 
otherwise occur.  Both texts suggest the possibility that further intervention in the 
market to address the information asymmetry may be efficient. 
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have no way to refute the former employer’s false attributions of credit for 
work the former employee did.  Trade secret law, work product privilege, or a 
contractual duty of confidentiality may prevent revelation of the information.  
In any event, it is a slow and therefore expensive way of signaling ability.  For 
a high velocity labor market to operate efficiently, information about 
prospective employees must be quick and cheap to obtain.   When the volume 
of resume checks goes up, as in the case in a labor market with high turnover, 
even small obstacles to gaining information can add up to significant costs 
associated with hiring. 
 
 In sum, existing attribution regimes suffer from generalizable 
problems.  Many of them function well much of the time, but there are 
widespread reports of arbitrariness and exploitation about which we can 
generalize.  Problems occur when one member of a collaborative work 
relationship uses the power she has through information asymmetries to behave 
opportunistically and claim credit which is not due.  Such opportunistic 
behavior occurs when there is a huge financial incentive (as when an 
innovation succeeds beyond anyone’s expectations) or some interpersonal 
incentive (such as sexual exploitation or personality conflict).  These problems 
have no doubt existed since the beginning of time, but the economic harm they 
inflict has grown in proportion to the economic importance of attribution in the 
information economy.  In work relationships where attribution is important, a 
sense of some collaborators that attribution will be made unfairly will cause 
problems going forward as collaborators will lose the incentive to contribute 
fully because they know (or fear) they will not reap all the rewards of their 
work.  The hard question is whether there is a cure that legal regulation could 
offer that is less harmful than the disease.  It is to that which I now turn. 
 
IV.  Towards a Theory of Fairness in Attribution 
 
 At this point in the project, I find myself with might be called a genre 
problem.  The convention for an article that recognizes some important new 
interest is to do one of two things.  Either the author proposes a bold new 
scheme of legal regulation to turn the important interest into a legal right, or the 
author concludes that the current regime is desirable – efficient, fair, or 
whatever – and that the current state of the law is just right.  My inclination, 
unfortunately, is to do neither.  So I will make a modest proposal, based largely 
on the concept of implied contract, which attempts to preserve much of the 
flexibility and local variation in norms-based systems while attempting to 
minimize opportunism and other market failures.  A comprehensive and legally 
enforceable right of attribution, whether in the form of a new section of the 
Restatement of Torts or in the form of a state or federal statute (the “Attribution 
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Act of 2006”), is neither feasible nor probably desirable.  Rather, I argue for 
enforcement of party-defined attribution rights as an element of existing 
employment contracts, and for loss of attribution rights to be recognized as a 
form of harm that should be actionable and compensable under other protective 
employment statutes or common law claims. 
 
Even this modest proposal for greater legal regulation must consider 
the likely impact of law on the current situation.  It has been argued that 
attribution should be left to these norms, enforced to the extent deemed 
desirable by the professional associations or other work communities that are 
“capable of considering the nuances of context, [rather] than the far more rigid 
legal system.”149  There are many reasons to preserve a central role for norms 
based attribution regimes.  After sketching out those, I will explain how my 
proposal can preserve many of them while remedying some of the most 
significant problems outlined in Part III.  
 
One of the benefits of the existing norms-based and contract-based 
system is its flexibility.  In a sector where credit is extremely valuable, as in 
Hollywood, an elaborate and expensive regime can exist, and in sectors where 
credit is less valuable, simpler and cheaper regimes exist.  A flexible system 
can adapt to changes in circumstances brought by new technology that enables 
new ways of transmitting credit information, or new ways of identifying 
contributors enabled by new work arrangements.  Credit can be given one way 
in one forum (as by putting a lawyer’s name on a pleading for Rule 11 
purposes) and another way in another forum (as by acknowledging assistance 
within a firm even when a name is not on a brief).  Participants in a given work 
culture are very good at learning the nuances of meaning in different forms of 
attribution. 
 
Informality in attribution may also play a crucial social-psychological 
role in workplaces by allowing collaborators not to focus on the comparative 
importance of their respective contributions. Institutionalizing a formal process 
for crediting particular contributions to particular employees, particularly when 
they work collaboratively, poses the risk that the collaborators will focus 
excessively on thinking about the value of their work rather than on the work 
itself.  Just as there are costs in failing to take attribution seriously enough to 
prevent false attributions, there are also costs in taking accuracy so seriously 
that parties to a collaborative work relationship focus unduly on identifying 
and seeking credit for their contributions.  As explained above, even when 
everyone is acting in good faith, it is often difficult to attribute work because 
                                                 
149 Band & Schruers, supra note 52 at 22. 
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before the creative process occurs it is difficult to negotiate in the abstract 
about work that is not yet done, and afterward participants in group projects 
consistently overestimate their contributions to a project when it succeeds and 
underestimate their share of blame when a project fails.   
   
Examples of the possible harms of excessive attention to attributing 
performance of a group to contributions of individuals are not hard to find.  
The business pages of the newspapers are full of examples of how executives 
whose compensation is tied to share price manipulate share price through 
short-term strategies at the expense of healthy growth for a firm.  Another 
example, still anecdotal but suggestive, comes from Japan.  An employee who 
led the team that invented the “Holy Grail of lighting technology,” the blue 
light emitting diode (LED), sued his employer claiming a greater share of the 
billions of dollars of profit than the $200 bonus he was paid.150  The Tokyo 
High Court ordered the employer, Nichia, to pay the former employee nearly 
$200 million under Article 35 of Japan’s patent law, which requires 
“appropriate remuneration” for patents assigned to employers.  The verdict 
prompted a host of similar suits that eventually dramatically changed 
compensation practices for employee inventors.  The legal change also 
prompted concern about a norm of selfless cooperation that some believe had 
previously characterized Japanese corporate R & D. What had previously been 
a collaborative work relationship, some feared, would become more rivalrous 
when employees realized that they stood to reap enormous compensation gains 
if they were identified as an “inventor” of the next valuable patent as opposed 
to simply one of the team.151  The fear is not unreasonable:  Once people 
realize that attribution is a finite resource, as would be the case if there are set 
rules defining who can be attributed in a particular role and who cannot, and if 
the financial returns to attribution are significant, some people will focus on 
their status as much as on the work itself.  Whether such a change in norms has 
occurred – and whether the norm of selfless cooperation ever existed – remains 
uncertain. 
 
The jockeying for position as the designated inventor, screen writer, or 
project member will not occur at the beginning of a collaborative project.  The 
                                                 
150 Norimitsu Onishi, Japan’s Inventors Want Credit and Money, INTL HERALD 
TRIB., May 2, 2005 at 1.  The LED inventor and Nichia eventually settled for eight 
million dollars.  Todd Zaun, Japanese Inventor Wins $8 Million in Patent Case, INTL 
HERALD TRIB., Jan. 12, 2005 at 16. 
151 See id.; Marc S. Reisch, Patent Pending:  A Series of Japanese patent Disputes 
Raises Questions About Employee Patent Rights, CHEM. & ENG. NEWS, Mar. 7, 2005 
at 16-17; Yuji Mizuno, LED Verdict Opens Can of Worms NIKKEI WKLY J. Feb. 9, 
2004 
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reason is that the work group often (though not always) will not know in 
advance whether there will be significant financial returns to attribution 
because they won’t know whether the project will succeed.  It is difficult to 
negotiate ex ante about divvying up credit for something that has not been 
created and may never be.  So one would expect the serious effort to secure 
attribution will occur towards the end of a collaborative process when it 
becomes apparent that attribution might have significant payoff.  There will 
always be something retrospective about attribution.  Thus it may be 
particularly beneficial to have rules established before a project begins to 
govern attribution to blunt the effect of the psychological tendency of people to 
inflate their own positive contributions and minimize the negatives. 
 
 My survey of attribution norms throughout American society 
convinces me that the degree to which and circumstances in which attribution 
should be granted varies.  Consequently, law should supplement but not 
supplant the process by which work communities create norms of attribution.   
To take just two examples, the fact that some news outlets have decided that 
reporters will work best if work is attributed to them, and thus employee expect 
fair attribution, should not render the business model of other news outlets 
illegal.  Hollywood’s labor market appears to be dependent on public 
attribution; the job market for speech writers is not.  One way that law can 
honor expectations and prevent opportunism while allowing flexibility and 
local variation is through contract.  Contract law enables the parties to a 
relationship to define their own obligations and then to seek enforcement when 
one threatens to defect.   
 
Contract law also has a mechanism to constrain private agreement 
when there is a social interest in doing so by imposing terms that parties cannot 
negotiate away.  The covenant of good faith and fair dealing is one; another is 
the public policy against the enforcement of certain contracts.  One cannot sell 
oneself into slavery, sell one’s labor at less than the minimum wage, or agree to 
a term of employment that would allow the employer to fire in retaliation for 
whistleblowing or exercising a statutory right. 
 
I propose that a right of attribution be regarded as an implied term of 
every employment agreement.  It might be analogous to the covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing as it is currently recognized in a few jurisdictions.  Once 
the employee has achieved a certain level of contribution to a project, the right 
to attribution for it would be vested.   
 
A right of attribution vis a vis the public would be waivable. 
Depending on the custom in the industry, a waiver could be easy for an 
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employer to secure (as in the case of speech writers or ghost writers), or hard 
(as in the case of graduate student research assistants).  In any context in which 
attribution to the public is necessary to protect the labor market position of 
contributors, waiver would be permissible only if the employer proved to the 
court that a fair process was used and adequate compensation was offered to 
secure the waiver. In that respect, it would resemble attribution in European 
moral rights regimes.152   
 
  I expect problems to arise when firms, once they realize that 
attribution rights are an implied term of employment agreements, attempt to 
negotiate around the term by asking employees to sign express agreements 
waiving attribution rights.  This is not an unrealistic expectation:  firms 
routinely ask employees to sign express agreements waiving any possible just 
cause protections and also waiving a right to sue in a judicial forum, as well as 
waiving rights to intellectual property, to engage in post-employment 
competition, and to use a wide range of knowledge or information that 
employees would otherwise be entitled to use.  I would expect, therefore, that 
courts would confront claims of waiver of a right to attribution.  In assessing 
those claims, the court would examine the evidence of the work culture 
according to the six criteria of transparency, participation, equality, efficiency, 
due process, and substantive fairness to see whether the default rule of 
attribution was validly waived.   
 
A court will have to distinguish between work cultures where waiver 
of a public right of attribution is easily proven (or perhaps, as in the case of 
speech writers presumed) and those in which waivers should not readily be 
found. When a court is asked to determine whether an employer’s failure to 
give credit to an employee for work she did breached the implied term 
regarding attribution, the court would first have to determine whether there is 
an attribution right.  That determination would look primarily to the norms of 
the workplace, just as courts routinely examine the dealings of the parties and 
the customs of the industry to give content to contracts. 
 
The one sense in which attribution rights may never be waived is in the 
sense that attribution becomes part of human capital and attribution must be 
fairly given when a creator is seeking other employment.  The Economist can 
decline to give bylines but it cannot decline to acknowledge within its own 
employee assessment processes or to prospective employers that one of its 
correspondents wrote, edited, or researched the articles that she in fact did.  
This limit on the alienability of attribution is not a significant change from 
                                                 
152 Waiver of moral rights is discussed in sources cited supra in note 47. 
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common practice:  a journalist whom I interviewed who wrote for The New 
York Times but did not receive a byline said that he got his next job after the 
Times by his editors acknowledging to editors at another paper which stories he 
had written.  What I propose that is new is nothing other than explicit legal 
recognition for what is already a widely accepted norm of fair dealing and may 
be considered by some to be an implied term of an employment contract. 
 
The final question is how to conceptualize the remedy for the harm 
caused by wrongful attribution.  Here it matters that an attribution right is 
conceived in contract rather than property terms.  Unlike a property right, a 
remedy for false attribution should not restrict access to or dissemination of the 
product or project to which she contributed.153  Attribution rights should not be 
an additional way to constrain the public domain and, thus, remedies for failure 
to attribute should operate in a way to require limited compensatory or make-
whole remedies to the claimant but not to enable the right-holder to restrict 
access to the project.  This is easy to see in a case in which the right of public 
attribution is waived and only a right of human capital attribution exists (as in 
the case of the journalist with no byline seeking another job).  
 
The harder case is where the right of public attribution is not waived.  
Let’s say, for example, that a software firm breaches the obligation to attribute 
software in the manner done in open source.  I propose that the software 
designer be able to sue for some measure of loss of reputation, but not prevent 
the software firm from distributing the mis- or unattributed software.  A right of 
attribution is not a right to exclude others from using, copying, or selling the 
information.  In this respect, it is not a property right in the intellectual property 
sense or in the right of publicity sense.  Nor would it be like joint authorship in 
copyright, which is thought to entitle all joint authors to prevent any use of the 
work with which they disagree and to reap an equal share of the profits from 
the work.154  Neither would it include a right to prevent alteration in the way 
that the moral right of integrity does.  In short, a remedy for failure to attribute 
should not be an injunction against distribution of the work without attribution, 
                                                 
153 See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and 
Inalienability:  One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972). 
154 In this respect, my proposal bears some resemblance to that made by Roberta 
Rosenthal Kwall with respect to joint authorship; she argues that the law should 
recognize that the economic interests of joint authors can be unequal where their 
contributions are not equal and, indeed, that the presumption of equal ownership 
unfairly advantages dominant authors by encouraging courts to reject entirely the 
claims of non-dominant authors rather than to acknowledge their proportional share.  
Kwall, “Author-Stories”, supra note 55 at 64. 
  3/24/2006 
66                                                                         CATHERINE L. FISK 
nor even necessarily a share of the profits from the project itself.  Rather, it 
would be a right to share the reputation benefits of authorship. 
 
One way to think of the distinction is this.  Intellectual property rights 
are the right to a stream of revenue associated with the sale or use of the 
information itself.  Sales of a Disney movie or of the blue LED produce 
millions of dollars, and the owner of the copyright or patent gets those dollars.  
This is the right of exclusivity.  Attribution rights are the rights to an entirely 
different revenue stream:  the financial rewards associated with being the 
creative person behind the valuable idea.  In other words, the right of 
exclusivity is entirely distinct from the right of attribution, and the remedies for 
infringement of the two rights are quite different.  Thus, although Disney owns 
the movie and the Japanese firm owns the LED, the screenwriter or animator 
enjoys the financial or other benefits of being the person who did the work, and 
that revenue is entirely divisible from the revenue attributable to the intellectual 
property itself.  It is important to recognize that whatever we may think about 
remedies for copyright or patent infringement, including a right to a portion of 
the revenue stream or even to block the revenue stream altogether by getting an 
injunction against sales of the product, we could have a completely different 
remedy structure for wrongful attribution. 
 
An example of such a remedial structure in operation is Hollywood’s 
screen credit system, which explicitly addresses the issue of remedies for 
violations of the credit rules.  The Writers’ Guild agreement prohibits claims of 
screen credit that are in derogation of credit determinations made through its 
processes.  Nevertheless, the agreement also explicitly states that there shall be 
no claim against the Guild, arbiters, or producers for errors in credit.  Nor, to 
my knowledge, has there been a case in which a remedy for an error in credit 
involved blocking the distribution of the film or TV show. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
As applied to credit, Shakespeare was right in the famous passage in 
Othello, but he did not go far enough.  Taking credit for someone else’s work 
or wrongly besmirching another’s reputation at work certainly does impoverish 
the person whose good name was filched. Besmirching is costly to reputation, 
market status, and opportunity; it’s a labor market failure. Contra Shakespeare, 
false attributions enrich the thief often enough that thieves will always exist.  
Moreover, the theft often confuses others who want accurate information about 
one’s good name, and there is no remedy under current U.S. law to compensate 
them for their loss.  For that reason, the transfer of attribution from the actual 
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creator (whenever she can be identified) should be prohibited in certain 
contexts unless it is shown that third parties will not be harmed by it and there 
is adequate proof that the transfer was compensated and uncoerced.   
 
In the absence of legal protection for the important interests in 
attribution, norms govern credit, and many industries have attempted to 
embody the norms into enforceable contracts, professional regulation, and even 
certain laws.  Yet substantial flaws exist in the way society allocates credit.  For 
these reasons, there should be a strong presumption against the alienability of 
attribution vis a vis the public in most work settings, and an inalienable right to 
attribution in human capital assessment. 
 
More than forty years ago, in an article published in the Yale Law 
Journal, Charles Reich surveyed the radical changes in wealth and society 
spawned by New Deal and Great Society government spending and asked 
readers to re-imagine government largess (as he called it) as a new form of 
property.155  He suggested that some functions that private property had 
hitherto performed in Anglo-American society were increasingly being 
performed by government spending programs and that to maintain the liberty 
that property law was thought to protect – “the troubled boundary between 
individual man and the state” – law should reconceptualize government 
benefits as a new property.  I have no illusion that my modest proposal either 
deserves or will have anything like the impact of his, but my project is not 
dissimilar in spirit.  In the modern world, in which intellectual property is a 
corporate asset and its control is almost completely divorced from individual 
creators, the law must re-imagine the role of the individual vis a vis the power 
to control information. The four functions that intellectual property ownership 
once performed – reward, discipline, branding, and humanizing – have 
increasingly been subsumed by attribution.  It is time for law to recognize the 
extraordinary importance of attribution, and take some modest steps to address 
the circumstances where the norms governing attribution break down to ensure 
that these socially valuable functions are performed in a desirable manner. 
 
One advantage of explicit recognition of attribution rights would be to 
reconcile the views of two opposing camps in the arena of employee-generated 
intellectual property.  One group advocates strong employer ownership.156  
Another camp, of which I am usually counted a member, advocates strong 
                                                 
155 Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733, 733 (1964). 
156 See Merges, supra note 28; Kitch, supra note 28. 
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employee rights.157  Advocates of employer ownership tend to emphasize the 
efficiencies that will be gained by corporate control of intellectual property and 
point out that most employees who generate it have been compensated for their 
creative services and thus are not victims of unfair treatment when they lose 
the right to control the disposition of the information products which they have 
created.  Employee advocates, by contrast, tend to make equity arguments 
emphasizing that employees are expected to be entrepreneurial about their 
careers and yet are deprived by strong corporate intellectual property rights 
(and aggressive use of contracts restricting post-employment competition) 
from being entrepreneurial.   
 
A partial resolution of this debate is the one I propose: to disaggregate 
the exclusivity rights associated with intellectual property from the attribution 
rights. Disaggregating the exclusivity right from the attribution right, giving 
exclusivity to the firm and attribution to the employee, would give both camps 
what they most value.  Of course, in the case of individually-owned patents and 
copyrights, intellectual property would still be a basis for attribution.  But with 
respect to corporate IP or other workplace knowledge, the firm would get one 
hundred percent (minus the wages paid) of the return on the investment in the 
creation of the knowledge.  Attribution would, however, enhance the ability of 
the employee to be entrepreneurial in the labor market. 
 
 I have deliberately eschewed a radical proposal of comprehensive 
regulation in favor of a modest suggestion that a right to attribution, at least in 
some contexts, be presumptively nonwaivable and nontransferable and be 
treated as an implied term in every employment contract.  A breach of that term 
by taking credit where it is not due should be actionable under state contract 
law, just as is a breach of an employment agreement requiring just cause for 
termination.  Moreover, a loss of attribution rights might be understood as one 
form of harm (and thus one element of damage) of an otherwise illegal adverse 
employment action, such as when an employee is fired or otherwise 
discriminated against on the basis of race, religion, disability, or when an 
employee is fired in breach of contract. 
 
                                                 
157 Katherine V.W. Stone, Knowledge at Work: Disputes Over the Ownership of 
Human Capital in the Changing Workplace, 34 CONN. L. REV. 721 (2002); Katherine 
V.W. Stone, The New Psychological Contract: Implications of the Changing 
Workplace for Labor and Employment Law, 48 UCLA L. REV. 519 (2001); Catherine 
L. Fisk, Reflections on the New Psychological Contract and the Ownership of 
Human Capital, 34 CONN. L. REV. 765 (2002). 
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One reason for taking a modest and incrementalist approach, besides 
those enumerated above, is to accommodate legal change to the complex and 
diverse sets of norms that currently govern attribution. Local variation is 
important and probably beneficial because it enables flexibility with respect to 
the right balance among the six characteristics of an ideal attribution system 
and the adaptation of the system to balance norms and law.  The goal is to 
improve the systems and prevent opportunism while preserving anonymity 
where anonymity is beneficial, to allow accountability where it is needed, and 
always to facilitate group collaboration that is increasingly a part of the 
creative process. 
